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Intense redevelopment has steamrolled across Seattle’s South Lake Union and 
Belltown neighborhoods, home to the headquarters of the world’s largest ecommerce 
corporation, Amazon. After the corporation established a presence in what is now 
referred to as ‘Amazonia’ in 2007, the surrounding urban landscape underwent a colossal 
metamorphic overhaul as high-tech and biotech industries, along with bourgeois luxury 
high rises, replaced old warehouses and empty parking lots. These new industries have 
attracted tens of thousands of people to the city, resulting in an oversaturated housing 
supply and an ensuing housing affordability crisis as rents have continued to skyrocket 
year after year. The circumstances surrounding the crisis suggest foul play not only by 
the megacorporation itself, but by developers and City officials, all supporting each other 
through a network of growth strategies that favor capital over people. This thesis 
therefore applies a critical mixed methods approach in conjunction with land rent theory 
to achieve two goals. First, I analyze the ‘roll-with-it’ circumstances of neoliberalized 
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policy-making decisions by the City that leads to an unveiling of Amazon’s dual-natured 
role as both a steward for the rent-seeking class and as a ‘glocalized’ actor operating at 
multiple scales of neoliberalization. Second, I investigate the potential factors that have 
helped create the housing affordability crisis using geospatial and statistical modelling 
techniques to find confirm that the strategies the City employed as they lie in bed with 
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CHAPTER ONE 
An Unholy Presence Lurks in the Heart of the Emerald City 
The majority of Americans and others around the globe have become familiar 
with Amazon.com (hereby referred to simply as Amazon), whether it’s through the 
company’s monstrous online retailing, its remarkable two-day shipping feature for Prime 
members, its online music and video streaming platforms, the myriad tech devices it 
offers, like FIRE, Kindle, Alexa, etc., or their lesser-known Amazon Web Services 
(AWS) that power cloud-computing services for powerful entities like the US 
Department of Defense, the United States Geologic Survey, the National Football 
League, Netflix, EPIC Games, and countless others. The company has ostensibly blessed 
the populace of the Global North with consumer convenience at a magnitude that has 
arguably never been seen before. The company garnered 80 million Prime subscriptions 
in the US alone by 2007 (Dunn, 2017), and their staggering net sales of $280.5 billion in 
2019 (Amazon.com, 2020) accounted for nearly fifty percent of all US ecommerce sales 
(Harlow and Stelter, 2019). Amazon is currently ranked second on the Fortune 500, 
second only to Walmart (Fortune, 2020), and its status as a powerful megacorporation is 
undeniable.  
Yet, the euphoric convenience of online shopping has made it all too easy for 
most consumers to overlook the abhorrent working conditions in Amazon distribution 
centers (Godlewski, 2018; Lieber, 2018; “The Amazon Diaries,” 2018a, 2018b, 2018c), 
where the median pay of $28,000 per year is the equivalent of what CEO Jeff Bezos 
makes in about nine seconds (Romano, 2018), and where there is a reputation of hiring 
health workers to treat fainting spells instead of paying for air conditioning (Hedge, 
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2018). Just as easily overlooked, the company uses monopolizing strategies (via 
algorithms based on customer ratings) to undercut the prices of successful vendors that 
use the Amazon.com platform, and by doing so eliminates their competition with 
cheaper, Amazon-manufactured commodities (G. Anderson, 2014; Budzinski and Köhler, 
2015). The company also owns more space around their Seattle headquarters (Figure 1) 
than the next 40 largest companies in the city combined (Rosenberg and González, 2017), 
topping eleven million square feet of offices in 2018 (“The Lessons of HQ1”, 2018) 
throughout 44 buildings (Ho, 2018). The political supremacy that has spawned from its 
imposing spatial presence and virtually unlimited spending power has also resulted in 
egregious and hostile political behavior that has threatened the democratic process in the 
Emerald City. This, I suggest, renders Amazon’s behavior appropriate for a critical 
analysis of a major economic player at the comparatively less examined “meso-scale” 
strata of contemporary processes of neoliberalization (Ward and Swyngedouw, 2018).  
In 2007 Amazon moved its HQ into South Lake Union (SLU), Seattle, and as the 
company has continued its accelerated growth, so too has intense gentrification in a part 
of the city that was previously, for the most part, large swaths of parking lots and light 
industry. By 2011 this redevelopment had expanded into neighboring Belltown, and 
nearly a decade later redevelopment projects have triggered a metamorphosis of the entire 
urban fabric north of downtown into a state-of-the-art hub for tech companies and 
biomedical research, complete with high-rise luxury apartment towers that litter the 
cityscape surrounding Amazon’s megalithic campus. In the last fifteen years land values 
in SLU and Belltown have increased by an average of 489%. In fact, the entire area (seen 
in Figure 1 as the South Lake Union and Belltown neighborhoods that encompass 
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Amazon’s campus) has been dubbed by locals as “Amazonia” (Garfield, 2018; Ho, 2018; 
Jacobs, 2019). In the wake of the negative outcomes from expansion and intensification, 
including a related spike in homelessness, a darker, more haunting sobriquet has 
metastasized: “Amageddon” (Reifman, 2014; Belko, 2017).  
Figure 1 
‘Amazonia’ in the Heart of Seattle 
 
Note. The orange polygon in the lower left map displays the extent of the map on the 




With 45,000 employees in Seattle (Nickelsburg, 2019a), the giant tech firm 
continues to act as a catalyst for a changing built environment as rent-seekers attempt to 
cash in on an influx of workers in high-paying tech jobs (Rosenberg, 2017a). These 
developments, condos and apartments alike, are said to require a tenant to make at least 
$96,000 per year (Jacobs, 2019); the average employee working at Amazon’s HQ makes 
an average of $110 thousand per year (Day, 2018; Rosenberg, 2018). In other words, the 
redevelopment of these neighborhoods appears to be specifically targeting Amazon 
employees, which suggest an emergent housing sub-market based primarily on one 
corporate giant’s employees.  
Exacerbating the issue, however, has been an influx of 75,000 new jobs between 
2013 and 2018 and 87,000 new Seattle residents (Le, 2018), causing what the Puget 
Sound Regional Council (2019, p. 6) documents as a “crisis of housing affordability” as 
demand for housing has skyrocketed citywide. Accordingly, another bubble in home 
prices has emerged, this time far exceeding the peak median home price of $481,000 in 
2007 before the Great Recession (Kane, 2013). In fact, between 2012 and 2016, the 
number of million-dollar homes tripled across the metropolitan area and 2017 saw a rise 
in home prices of more than $100,000 (Rosenberg, 2016a, 2017b), pushing the income 
required to afford the median house price up to $135,000 (inadvertently pricing out the 
employees the market hoped to lure in) (Rosenberg, 2018). Similarly, rents increased 
69% between 2010 and 2018 (ibid., 2018), steadily rising year by year while producing a 
homeless population close to 12,000 (Constantine, 2020).1  
 
1 It is worth noting that countywide, over 22,500 households experienced homelessness in 2018 (Maritz and 
Wagle, 2020), alluding to the underexaggerated nature of homeless counts. 
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The number of renters is now roughly equivalent to the number of homeowners 
due to oversaturation of the homebuyer’s market (Balk, 2020), and the citywide median 
rent for a one-bedroom dwelling is $1,297 per month (Thorsby, 2019), nearly half of the 
cost of an equivalent unit in South Lake Union (Zillow, Inc., 2020). However, vacancy in 
2019 was reported at 17% in South Lake Union (Rosenberg, 2019a; 2019b) and 16% in 
Belltown (ibid., 2019a), defying conventional supply/demand logic and demanding 
critical explication. The literature on gentrification and urban neoliberalism (in 
geography and beyond) is now massive (see Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Leitner, Peck, 
and Sheppard, 2007; Lees, Slater, and Wyly, 2008). Yet, beyond Neil Smith’s (1996) 
“rent-gap” thesis, only a small number of scholars have examined the process of 
gentrification through the broader lens of land rent theory (see M. Anderson, 2014, 2019; 
Ward and Aalbers, 2016). It is in this context that this study is situated.   
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework from which I draw upon is chiefly rooted in land rent 
theory, as it points our attention to the sociopolitical forces behind processes of rent 
extraction which, in turn, allows us to better understand the behavior of capital flow that 
permeates the neoliberal city. After a flourishing literature in the 1970s and 1980s, 
chiefly inspired by Harvey’s research on 1970s Baltimore, interest in land rent theory 
declined in the 1990s due to a variety of reasons, i.e., shifting intellectual agendas due to 
the cultural turn, the challenging methodological issues that arise from applying the rent 
categories in empirical examination, and the confusing theoretical debates that marked 
much of the literature during the 1980s (see Park, 2014; Haila, 2015, Ward and Aalbers, 
2016). Rent can be subdivided into various categories depending on the specific 
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economic relationships between landowners, producers, and consumers, a topic which I 
devote a lengthy discussion to in chapter two.  
This study is particularly focused on the circumstances surrounding the extraction 
of what are called class-monopoly rents, which are the portion of rent payments 
attributable to landowners acting as a class to maximize the rents they receive from 
tenants based on the inherent monopoly of land afforded to them vis-à-vis ownership and 
private property rights. Studying the circumstances involved in the appropriation of rents 
through “class monopolies” allows us to sound the alarm, so to speak, when groups of 
landowners (such as developer cartels or individual landlords) collectively engage in 
unethical and immoral behavior that serve to oppress a class of renters. Assuming that 
landowners do engage in this form of collaborative and anticompetitive behavior, given a 
long legacy of research that points to evidence of this (M. Anderson, 2014, 2019; Bryson, 
1997; Charnock, Purcell and Ribera-Fumaz, 2014; Harvey, 1974; Jaeger, 2003; King, 
1989; Wyly, Moos, Hammel and Kabahizi, 2009; Wyly, Newman, Schafran, and Lee, 
2010; Wyly, Moos and Hammel, 2012), the objective of this thesis is two-fold: first, to 
investigate Amazon’s role, as a major megacorporation, in the extraction of class-
monopoly rents; and second, to investigate Amazon’s impact on the current affordability 
crisis through quantitative analysis.  
By understanding Amazon’s role in increasing the exchange value of local real 
estate (therefore creating an environment rich for exploiting rents) and exacerbating the 
housing affordability crisis, this thesis deepens our understanding of the increasing role 
and power of megacorporate actors operating at the “meso-scale” of neoliberalization 
(Ward and Swyngedouw, 2018). Amazon has adopted a strategy of usurping political 
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dominance to obtain their economic goals – much to the chagrin of the City of Seattle and 
its residents. Moreover, while questions involving rent and rent theory have experienced 
a slow resurgence in critical urban studies over the last decade, there have been very few 
studies that explicitly and empirically examine class monopoly rent (c.f., M. Anderson, 
2014, 2019), and even fewer that focus on rent in Seattle. This is especially the case in 
the context of corporate actors like Amazon and their relationships with the ‘unholy 
trinity’ of developers, financial institutions, and local government, identified by Logan 
and Molotch (2007) as “growth machines,” and by M. Anderson (2014, 2019) as the key 
agents in class monopoly rent realization in both Chicago, Illinois, and Portland, Oregon.  
The desiderata, then, of this thesis unfolds in the following manner as a way to 
operationalize my goals. First, I draw upon a historical narrative of the development of 
South Lake Union into what it is today to give the reader a broader understanding of the 
specific partnerships between public and private sector actors that have spearheaded the 
city’s increasingly neoliberalized policy framework (and land values). This also sets the 
stage for examining the behavior of the rental market in Amazonia over the last decade as 
developers have sought profitability through their redevelopment projects, unleashed by 
Amazon’s arrival on the scene. Simultaneous with the affordability crisis, Amazon has 
increasingly administered ruthless tactics to counteract the City’s attempts to curb the 
crisis, at one point holding 7,000 jobs hostage while demanding a repeal of a corporate 
tax that would help generate affordable housing. The role that the megacorporation has 
thus played has served not only their own bottom line, but it has also served to enhance 
the rents commanded by invested development companies in the SLU and Belltown area.  
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Second, measuring the impact of Amazon on the affordability crisis is 
accomplished through the application of both geospatial and statistical analyses. While 
Amazon has largely taken the blame for the affordability crisis by locals (Shapiro, 2015), 
often dubbed the “Amazon Effect” (Twaij, 2019), there have been no empirics to support 
this claim apart from observational and anecdotal evidence. I therefore employ 
quantitative methods, discussed in further detail in the following section and in chapter 
four, to incorporate multiple factors that have significantly impacted a change in land 
values (and thus the ability to command greater rents) since 2010, foregoing speculation 
and drawing conclusions instead from raw data.   
Methodology 
A Mixed Methods Approach 
I employ a mixed method approach using GIS, statistical analysis, and critical 
discourse analysis to examine Amazon’s role in shaping an opportunistic environment for 
the extraction of class monopoly rents, as well as the company’s overall impact on the 
housing affordability crisis in Seattle. This mode of analysis does not come without its 
own problems, however. In this section I will first outline the issues involved with the 
administration of quantitative methods in the field of critical geography, followed by 
Wyly’s (2011) proposed solution to these issues. I will then address the mixed methods 
as a whole, discussing the dialectical relationship between the qualitative and quantitative 
aspects of my research, followed by brief explanative summaries of each method (of data 
collection and analysis) employed.   
Pondering the Positivist Problem: Palliative Positive Progress?  
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As a critical GIS practitioner, urban studies present an abundance of problems at 
the technical level, particularly due to a lack of methodologically robust studies in the 
field. To be sure, there is no lack in the variation or breadth of GIScience research, and 
indeed many complex contemporary problems are being examined with the application of 
GIS and other similar data management software. However, even the maps created by the 
best-intentioned practitioners can still be construed as the products of powerful rhetoric 
and subjective realities (Crampton, 2001). By ‘straddling the fence’ (O’Sullivan, 2006) 
between scientifically robust quantitative research on the one hand, and abstracted 
qualitative research on the other, we have the opportunity of blending the two in a mixed 
method framework that can both elucidate an understanding of “empirical reality” and 
position ourselves for positive change.  
This is challenging in several ways. First, there is a long legacy stemming from 
the early ‘70s to do away entirely with quantitative methods in critical geography 
(Harvey, 1972). Second, and intimately tied to the first reason, there is an almost tangible 
lack of research informed by critical theory that uses GIS in methodologically robust 
ways, perhaps due to the apprehension felt by GIS practitioners to engage in theory over 
the last several decades (Schuurman, 2000). As such, those adopting a critical positivism 
(e.g., Critical GIS, Critical Cartography) are often left to wonder whether the methods we 
employ are adequate, or conversely, whether their quantitative means will ruffle too 
many antipositivist feathers. 
Harvey’s (1972) dismissal of formal theory and positivist methods provoked a 
deep fracture in the field of geography that has yet to fully heal. Much of this 
unfortunately had to do with the conservative political alignment that so completely 
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pervaded positivist ideology at the time (Wyly, 2011). On top of this, positivism was the 
toolbelt of neoclassical political economists; the antipodal pharisees of Marx’s primary 
critique (Barnes, 2009). Thus, Harvey rejected quantitative methods as a means to 
distance critical geography from the stewards of capital incarnate (ibid., 2009). A 
consequence (intended or not) of Harvey’s critique, I suggest, was that it extended to 
quantitative analyses and logic in general: if neoclassical political economists equal 
quantitative methodology, and critical geography does not equal neoclassical political 
economy, then critical geography does not equal quantitative methodology. In other 
words, if A = B, and C ≠ A, then C ≠ B. This implies that his logic, though admittedly not 
quite so simple, was nevertheless insular, and it is a shame that the discipline’s legacy has 
been so deeply shaped by this misunderstanding. For, as Barnes (2009: p. 293) points out, 
there is “no inherent contradiction between mathematics and critique.” Marx spent a great 
deal of time using mathematics to formulate his arguments (occasionally successful, 
though other times not so much). By rejecting positivist methodologies, critical urban 
geography has been, arguably, stunted in methodological development which has resulted 
not only in a “factionalization” of the discipline, but also “anxieties of purpose” (Wyly, 
2011: p. 890).  
Wyly suggests, then, of embracing positivism with “radical social justice as the 
ends, with scientific rigor as the means.” (2011: p. 895, original emphasis). In what he 
coins ‘positive radicalism’, he dares geographers to ‘take down the master’s house with 
the master’s tools’. He identifies two separate ways this can be done: through roll-back 
radical positivism, or counter-positivism, and roll-out radical positivism. In the former, 
we are invited as critical geographers to use quantitative methods to disentangle facts 
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from the “orthodox hegemony of theological neoliberalism” (ibid., 2011: p. 906), and 
expose conservative lies for what they are. In the latter, we are invited to use quantitative 
methodologies to create new and emancipatory alternatives. Great examples of this are 
Wyly’s use of statistics to apply rent theory to predatory lending practices nationwide, as 
well as his employment of statistical analyses to examine displacement patterns in New 
York City (Wyly et al., 2009; Wyly, et al., 2010). 
In the spirit of ‘positive radicalism’, then, my intention is to do the same: to use 
the quantitative methods in my own toolbelt, as it were, to create an emancipatory 
alternative by using spatial statistics and mapping to enhance my qualitative research. 
Additionally, this serves to answer the call of Dahman (2010) to not merely use GIS to 
visualize contextual space, but to use cartographic analysis to create new knowledges 
through critical interpretation. Bearing all this in mind, I will now proceed to discuss the 
dialectical nature of my mixed methods approach.  
Dial M for Mixed 
 Similar to Creswell’s (2017) convergent parallel mixed methods, where the 
results of the quantitative analysis are compared to the results of the qualitative analysis 
side-by-side at the end of both analyses, I enhance this by integrating Strauss’s (1987) 
grounded theory methodology where each piece of research is considered in its dialectic 
interrelatedness. In other words, each factor in the research is considered to mutually 
influence and inform one another. Through the collection phase of data each new piece is 
informed by all the previous parts, while also informing the next parts and unveiling 
patterns that create a well-grounded basis for theory. This is used especially throughout 
the codification process although it also serves as a general guidance to forming 
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interpretations and conclusions throughout the thesis. By conducting research in this 
manner, the interpretation of results from both the qualitative and quantitative analyses 
are triangulated and validated insofar as they compliment and enlighten each other 
through the interlocking web of relationships that are untangled and exposed throughout 
the research phase. The overall logic structure of these methods is outlined in Figure 2.  
Figure 2 
Logic Structure of Mixed Methods 
 
Note. Steps of data processing are not included in diagram but are rather discussed in 
chapters three and four.  
Qualitative Analysis 
The qualitative portion of my analysis steers the research into a critical discourse 
analysis (c.f. Fairclough, 2003), investigating both the discursive tactics used in rent 
capture, as well as the neoliberalized policies employed throughout the rollout of 
intensive redevelopment in the South Lake Union and Belltown neighborhoods and how 
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this capture has been enhanced through the dynamics of Seattle’s growth machine (Logan 
and Molotch, 2007). Nearly 300 textual documents, including articles from the Seattle 
Times, news articles from the NexisUni database, publications from City and County 
websites, landlord organization websites, among others were included in this analysis. 
Assessment of these documents allowed me to not only understand and recreate the local 
narrative of the area discussed in chapter three (through what is said in publications), but 
also to explore the situated meanings (Gee, 1999) underlying the language used in those 
same publications. Through a systematic codification of relevant documents based on 
Strauss’s (1987) grounded theory and a scheme based on a typology I discuss in chapter 
two, I was able to explore both what is said and what is not said – what appears to be 
going on at the surface of rent extraction and what appears to be going on surreptitiously 
as coalitions of developers and landlords seek out class-monopoly rents.  
This analysis incorporates the broader implications between the discursive 
strategies executed by landlords and developers, in close collaboration with the City, that 
ideologically defend increasingly neoliberal policies as a mode of profit-maximization on 
the one hand, and the hostile attempts by Amazon to usurp democracy in the name of 
capital accumulation on the other. Amazon’s influence at the meso-scale of 
neoliberalization is thus examined in relation to the steam-rolling effect that developers 
have had on reifying their power as rent-seekers.   
Quantitative Analyses 
The quantitative portion of this thesis, then, includes two separate phases of 
analysis that investigates the effects of Amazon’s presence on rent in particular and the 
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affordability crisis more generally. The first phase involved using spatial data to explore 
the geospatial characteristics of Amazonia where I analyzed the spatial distribution of 
current tax-appraised land values at the parcel-scale.2 This was accomplished through the 
generation of heat maps and subsequent optimized hot spot analyses to interpret and 
compare where the highest land values, and thus rents, are in relation to Amazon’s 
campus. The results from this phase show that a significant clustering of high land values 
exist harmoniously with the spatial positioning of Amazon’s campus, therefore offering a 
scientific basis and justification for the use of Amazon’s geospatial presence as a 
potential independent variable in the next phase of analysis.    
In the second phase of quantitative analysis I employed a multiple linear 
regression model to help explain what factors, including the presence of Amazon, have 
significantly influenced the increase of land values through time across the study area. 
Variables were identifies from available public data as well as private county data 
accessed with the help of a GIS librarian from the University of Washington. This part of 
the analysis required the integration of other locational and social factors that are 
generally considered to affect land values, like zoning types, proximity factors (i.e., 
distance to water, parks, transit, etc.) and social demographics, into one master dataset via 
a GIS environment. This was exported into a comma-separated values (CSV) table that 
was used in IBM SPSS to generate a multiple linear regression model. The final model 
uses all significantly contributing geospatial variables to predict a function of the increase 
in land values between 2005 and 2019. This model offers quantitative evidence that 
 
2 While rent data may not be available at the parcel scale, my analysis takes a leap of faith with the logical 
assumption that the relationship between land values and rents may be considered more or less linear, and 
that as a building increases in value, so too will its rents. This rate may not be 1:1, but that does not matter 
because we are not interested in the actual rent, but the generalized characteristics of it. 
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suggests that while Amazon’s spatial influence on increasing land values in the area has 
not been a statistically significant factor in the creation of an affordability crisis, other 
forces involved in the procurement of class monopoly rents have exhibited such 
significance in increasing land values (and therefore rents), and are not based on the 
neoclassical assumptions of supply and demand logic. Rather than blame Amazon 
directly on the affordable crisis, the model suggests deeper implications that are 
supported by a rich narrative supplied in chapter three through the administration of my 
qualitative methods.  
Limitations 
As with any research study, there are invariably a number of limitations to my 
research, from the lack of breadth that is a product of the countless paths that it could 
have taken, to the very real and tangible constraints of time and the punctual completion 
of the work. For the sake of credibility as a researcher, it is nonetheless my responsibility 
to identify those limitations that I have been forced to consider outright as I have worked 
through the stages of the research. First, this thesis is greatly limited by the lack of other 
GIS-based research in the literature on rent and land rent theory. Those that do look at 
rent tend to use it for technical applications and do not consider its theoretical 
implications (see, for instance, Chen, Liu, Li, Liu, and Xu, 2016). Second, I chose to 
work with land value data instead of rent data, as justified in the first footnote of this 
chapter and clarified further in chapter four. This is because publicly available rent data 
are at the census tract level. While this may be good and fine for regional studies, at the 
larger neighborhood scale the spatial patterns of tract-level data are lost due to the 
Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (MAUP). Consequently, I decided to carry out my 
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research with publicly available parcel data. Thirdly, the largest scale (being at the block 
level) of demographic data I gathered from the U.S. Census Bureau is from 2010, and as 
such do not reflect the demographics of the study area as they exist today. While I make a 
point of this in chapter four, future studies hold the potential of incorporating 2020 data 
to produce a potentially more accurate statistical model.   
Structure of Thesis 
The general cadence of the rest of the thesis mimics the outline of this chapter in 
terms of the logical structure of research and findings. Chapter two dives into land rent 
theory in great detail, where I explore the history and development of the theory and offer 
my own contributions. Chapter three serves as the qualitative analytic portion of the 
thesis that begins with a description of the methods employed before walking the reader 
through a constructive narrative of the last twenty years of South Lake Union. The 
narrative (and integrated analysis) explores the continued adoption of neoliberal policies 
that have served the Seattle growth machine throughout the development of Amazon’s 
campus, the coeval housing affordability crisis, and as a response to Amazon’s attempts 
to usurp the democratic process. Chapter four describes the methods, results, and 
discussion of the quantitative analysis. Chapter five brings the thesis to a cumulative 
close, drawing upon the results and implications of both qualitative and quantitative 
analyses to develop a broader discussion on the role Amazon has played in enriching an 







Critical rent theory has been a topic of keen interest and debate among critical 
scholars and urban theorists over the last fifty years (see Park, 2014; Ward & Aalbers, 
2016). This is due to its fundamental ties with political economy through the complex 
interrelationships between land, labor and capital that mark the increasingly dynamic and 
turbulent urban landscape (Christophers, 2016; Harvey, 1989). Yet, engagement in the 
rent literature has dwindled over the last thirty years (see Aalbers, 2007; M. Anderson, 
2014, 2019; Baxter, 2014; Charnock, Purcell and Ribera-Fumaz, 2014; Christophers 
2016; Haila, 2015; Harvey, 2006a, 2012; Jaeger, 2003; Park, 2014; Smet, 2016; Tretter, 
2009; Ward & Aalbers, 2016; Wyly, Moos, Hammel and Kabahizi, 2009; Wyly, Moos 
and Hammel, 2012). This is curious, because as Christophers (2016) emphasizes, land 
and political economy are dialectically related. As such it deserves special attention as a 
pivotal nexus through which we may advance our understanding about the dynamic 
processes driving capital flow in and through the built environments of the capitalist city. 
This is what contemporary rent theorists seek to accomplish, yet differing (even 
contradictory) approaches regarding the application and further development of rent 
theory have produced notable confusion pertaining to the myriad ways in which the 
juggernaut of capital continues to shape the city of the twenty-first century.  
One general frustration in developing a robust theory of rent is related to the 
various ways in which land itself has been conceptualized. At first glance, land is simply 
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the ground beneath our feet that extends until we have reached the sea.3 As such, it is in 
finite supply. Moreover, it is the space upon which we live out our lives and the setting 
for myriad socio-spatial geographical interactions. It is also treated like a commodity 
insofar as it can be chopped into discrete parcels that can be bought and sold in a 
capitalist economy. However, unlike other commodities, land is itself spatially fixed and 
permanent (Bryson, 1997; Harvey, 2006a), and possesses value that has not actually been 
produced by human labor (beyond the state-based act of imposing imaginary boundary 
lines around the resulting parcels). It is also unique from other commodities in that its 
exchange value transcends space-time constraints insofar as its value can be determined 
by past, present, and future uses: it is a spatially-fixed conduit through which value nearly 
constantly flows (as the surplus value realized by industrial or commercial tenants or the 
wages realized by workers in need of shelter). Facilitating this flow of value is the private 
property institution which gives land/property owners the legal power to demand any rent 
at all (M. Anderson, 2019; Harvey, 1974; Haila, 2015; Ward & Aalbers, 2016).  
It is in this hazy realm – between the spatial fixity of land on the one hand and the 
temporal fluidity of exchange value on the other – in which land theorization unfolds, and 
upon which rent theory has historically developed. Rent is, in essence, the momentary 
resolution of the space-time problematic of land value. Thus, centering rent, conceptually 
and analytically, provides the basis for theorizing the flow of capital (e.g., value 
mobilized toward the production and realization of surplus value) through the land, and 
directs our focus toward the interconnected relationships between the appropriation of 
 
3 In Capital, Volume III Marx includes water in his definition of land “insofar as it belongs to someone as 
an accessory to the land” (1894/2010, p. 461).  
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rent by capital incarnate, the (re)production of the capitalist-built environment, and the 
accumulation and circulation of capital more broadly (Bryson, 1997; Christophers, 2016; 
Harvey, 1989; Jaeger, 2003; King, 1989; C. Ward 2019).  
The Monopoly Power to Command Rent 
Let’s turn our attention again to the finite nature of land and its relation to 
political economy. It is the governing powers over land that determine how it is to be 
used. Its finite nature also renders it a scarce resource, which means that it can be subject 
to commodity exchange (despite not being produced by human labor). In a capitalist 
political economy land is thus balkanized at various scales and sold as private property, 
while treated as a financial asset: it’s purchase represents an initial investment and 
exclusive claim to the promise of future streams of rent, from which forms the return on 
the initial investment.4 As Marx (1894/2010, p. 461) more critically puts it, 
landownership represents an inherent “monopoly by certain persons over definite 
portions of the globe as exclusive spheres of their private will to the exclusion of all 
others.” The governing state (at least in the United States) acts both as the initial capitalist 
landowner from which purchases of land are made, and as a continuous “absolute” 
landowner to which rents are paid in the form of property taxes (in exchange for 
enforcing the private property institution) (M. Anderson, 2019). Rent, then, is the transfer 
of funds from a person to a landowner in exchange for the right to use the land in 
question (Harvey, 1974, 2006; Harvey and Chatterjee, 1974; Haila, 2015; Smet, 2016; 
Ward and Aalbers, 2016). The agent using the land (and any structure thereon) can be a 
 
4 Rent here is described as it is in an economy under capitalism. In other economic systems, i.e., feudalism, 
rent was paid to lords in a different form than it appears today.  
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residential tenant, farmer, business owner, or homeowner (insofar as the interest paid to 
mortgage lending institutions represents a form of rent). The resultant rift between those 
that own land and those that do not engenders a social dichotomy that allows for the 
exploitation of the class of renters by the class of landowners through the rent-seeking 
behavior (i.e., to maximize profits) afforded to them via the monopoly power inherent in 
landownership (M. Anderson, 2019; Haila, 2015; Harvey, 2012; Ward & Aalbers, 2016). 
Furthermore, due to the dissociation of land from other commodities, the determining 
factors of its price, and of the rents that can be demanded, are not based on the production 
process (as are other commodities) but on exogeneous circumstances (Jaeger, 2003). 
These circumstances are the general focus of land rent theory as they describe the 
socioeconomic and political relations that are involved in shaping the capitalist city, and 
thus engender a deeper explanatory narrative and understanding of the geographic flow of 
capital through the (built) environment.   
History of Land Rent Theory 
Contributions by Classical Economists 
Rent theory has its origins in classical political economy, arising as a means to 
explain the differential value of agricultural land. The most basic tenets hold that one 
must pay for the value bestowed by God in nature (Park, 2014; Ward & Aalbers, 2016). 
Adam Smith attributed rent to the monopoly that exists because of scarcity of land (Park, 
2014), a notion predicated on private property rights. This immediately contradicts his 
own labor theory, as Ward & Aalbers (2016) point out, because the value of any 
commodity is based on the cost of production plus the labor expended in producing it. As 
land (in its most basic state) is not produced by labor this led to further theoretical 
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revisions resulting in the precursory formulation of a modern typology of rent and the 
birth of the concept of differential rent (Park, 2014; Ward & Aalbers, 2016).  
James Anderson first introduced differential rent as a way to reconcile the 
problem of land having value (despite not being produced via human labor) by claiming 
that the soil with the least fertility cost the most to harvest and therefore acts as a basis for 
profit sharing between landlords and farmers (ibid., 2014, 2016). In this sense land, while 
not productive of value itself, forms part of the capital that is valorized through the labor 
process. Political economist David Ricardo modified Anderson’s theory by identifying 
the most marginal land in cultivation, i.e., the land with the worst possible soil and 
growing conditions, as a baseline from which the value all other land could be compared. 
Influencing the market price of a given agricultural commodity, land value is then a 
determinant of the amount of rent that a landlord can command from a farmer (with the 
most marginal land demanding no rent) (Park, 2014; Haila, 2015; Ward and Aalbers, 
2016). The idea that cultivation of the worst land could not command rent but determined 
the market price was wholly rejected by Thomas Malthus, however, who believed that 
even the most marginal land commanded rent and that rent was instead part of the 
production costs (Park, 2014). After all, private ownership and the institution of private 
property predisposes landowners to demand payment for the use of their assets, even 
under less than ideal conditions (Haila, 2015). 
Marx’s Contributions 
Marx, ever troubled with the various forms of capitalist exploitation and class 
struggle, sought to retheorize rent through the distribution side of economics, juxtaposed 
to Malthus’s focus on the production side (Harvey, 2006a). In his theorizing of land he 
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shifted focus from the dichotomous struggle between wage laborer and capitalist and 
decidedly incorporated a third class, that of landowners, into the division of society to 
better explain land as constituting agricultural means of production, the “monopolizable 
and alienable” (ibid., 2006a, p. 334) attributes of land, and the relationship between rent 
and profits (ibid., 2006a). He thus formulated a typology that incorporated a more robust 
theorization of differential rent in addition to the role of natural and social monopolies, 
and in doing so broke the concept of rent up into three constituent categories: monopoly 
rent, absolute rent, and differential rent. (Park, 2014; Ward & Aalbers, 2016).  
Differential Rent 
In Capital, Vol. III, Marx (1894/2010) initially found Ricardo’s theorization of 
differential rent intelligible, but upon closer observation split it into two subcategories, 
Differential Rent I and Differential Rent II (hereafter referred to as DR1 and DR2, 
respectively), as two distinct ways in which landlords could command rent from the 
competitive advantages of different land quality without affecting the price of the 
commodity produced on the land (Harvey, 2006a; Ward and Aalbers, 2016). DR1 refers 
to the portion of rent that landlords command that is attributable to the increased 
productivity of the land based on some intrinsic quality, or existing feature, of the land 
(M. Anderson, 2019; Ward and Aalbers, 2016). Marx synthesized insights from John 
Stuart Mill with his own to classify DR2 as the rent commanded by a landlord that is 
attributable to enhanced productivity due to some additional capital investment onto the 
land (M. Anderson, 2019; Park, 2014; Ward and Aalbers, 2016). Marx also pointed out 
that DR2 could be transformed into DR1 as the improvements made on the land from 
additional investment become a permanent feature of productivity over time (Park, 2014). 
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In this respect DR1 serves as the basis of DR2, but it was the relationship between the 
two categories in which Marx was most interested (Harvey, 2006a). As Harvey (2006) 
points out, however, differentiating between the two is empirically impossible as the 
portion of rent due to the natural soil quality and that which is due to capital investment is 
left opaque – “in the end the landowner appropriates differential rent without knowing its 
origin” (ibid., 2006a, p. 357).  
Monopoly Rent & Absolute Rent 
Monopoly rent was identified by Marx as the basis of impaired competition 
through either actual monopoly conditions of land scarcity or through consumer 
willingness to pay higher than otherwise standard prices for land (or commodities 
produced on that land) that feature qualities that are nonsubstitutable, to be found 
nowhere else (M. Anderson, 2019; Haila, 2015; Harvey, 2006a; Ward & Aalbers, 2016). 
These prices affect the price of the commodities produced, contrary to differential rent 
(Ward & Aalbers, 2016). In the case of land scarcity, Marx saw monopoly prices 
affecting primarily working-class housing, whereas in higher-income housing monopoly 
prices can be set due to the scarcity that results from conditions of exclusivity inherent to 
status symbols of prestige (they wouldn’t be status symbols if they weren’t scarce, and 
thus, perceivably unique in some important way) (Harvey, 2006a). At the heart of 
monopoly rent, as mentioned, is the absolute power of ownership granted through the 
institution of private property. As Harvey (2012) states,  
“Monopoly rent arises because social actors can realize an enhanced income 
stream over an extended time by virtue of their exclusive control over some 
directly or indirectly tradable item which is in some crucial respects unique and 
non-replicable” (p. 90). 
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Ever scrupulous in his analyses, Marx further subdivided monopoly rent into two 
distinct forms – monopoly rent, and absolute monopoly rent. With monopoly rent, as 
discussed, the rents landowners are able to demand stem from particularly unique natural 
features, like a waterfall or an ore deposit, or due to unique, nonreplicable features of the 
land or the commodity produced on said land, such as sparkling wine produced in 
Champagne (Harvey, 2006a; Park, 2014; Ward and Aalbers, 2016). Marx also suggested 
that monopoly rents were the primary source of rent in densely populated cities, where 
demand often exceeds supply (Haila, 2015; Harvey, 2006a).  
Absolute monopoly rent, also known as absolute rent, was the most difficult 
theoretical concept for Marx to develop without violating his law of value (Harvey, 
2006a). This is because unlike differential and monopoly rents, which are based very 
much on material conditions, absolute rent (hereafter referred to as AR) stems from the 
existence of a class of land owners acting collectively (though not necessarily 
intentionally) and is thus a social condition. Marx gave it two forms: one based on the 
production of artificial scarcity due to reservation pricing, and the other by cartel-like 
action of landlords acting in collective, class-interest to seek the highest possible profits 
from the renting class (Haila, 2015; Park, 2014; Ward and Aalbers, 2016). Essentially, 
AR is, at the very least, the minimum amount of rent landowners can command for the 
most marginal land (as opposed to nothing), as alluded to by Malthus in the discussion 
above. Landowners are not going to rent out a parcel of land if they cannot command any 
rent (M. Anderson, 2019; Haila, 2015). Thus, following Marx, absolute rent is, at the 
very least, the ‘socially acceptable’ minimum return, or ‘reservation price’ (below which 
landowners opt to keep the land out of circulation) that landowners can demand by virtue 
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of both the class interests of, and monopoly powers afforded to, landowners acting 
uniformly in these ways.  
Neoclassical Development  
In 1826 Von Thünen introduced a new model to explain agricultural rent based on 
the inclusion of the costs of transporting commodities to the market (Rodrigue, 2016; 
Ward & Aalbers, 2016). In his model, rent is calculated as the market price of the 
commodity minus the farmer’s necessary income plus the costs of transportation (Ward 
& Aalbers, 2016). This model was based on the three basic assumptions that there was 
only one isolated market in the center of a city, that all land had universal characteristics, 
and that farmers transported their goods directly to the market without major roads 
(Rodrigue, 2016). While this model served as a satisfactory heuristic for a time, it fails to 
reflect the increasingly complex spatial organization of land markets today. By the 1960s, 
however, it was adopted by economists Alonso and Muth to allow for more flexibility 
with respect to differences in land use, variations of taste, and differences in development 
costs, among other factors (Ward & Aalbers, 2016). The Alonso-Muth model is also 
known as bid-rent theory and is still used by neoclassical economists. While bid-rent 
theory has been wholly ignored by Marxist scholars, Ward & Aalbers (2016) point out 
that bid-rent can still be used to make significant progress in the theorization of rent 
based on the differential properties of locational advantages. In short, land does often cost 
more for renters if access to that land means reduced transportation costs: it pays to be 




Marxist Resurgence (Marx est mort, vive Marx!)  
Harvey revitalized Marx’s theories on rent in 1974 with a case study in Baltimore, 
Maryland, in which he and coauthor Chatterjee focused on absolute rent in the context of 
the role of mortgage lending institutions in structuring the geography of distinct housing 
submarkets. This captured the attention of other urban scholars who began to focus on the 
relationships between class and power by utilizing the heuristics of monopoly and 
absolute rent as conceptual organizing devices (Ward & Aalbers, 2016). These 
approaches became a focal point from which rent was theorized over the next two 
decades, opposed to neoclassical approaches based solely on competition (ibid., 2016).   
The Rent Gap 
Another prolific advancement in rent theory was achieved by Neil Smith in the 
1980s. A student of Harvey, Smith built upon the conceptual framework developed by 
Behnke, Evers, & Möller in 1976 for “potential rent” (cited in Haila, 2015). Simply put, 
potential rent is the amount of rent a landowner could command if the land were put to a 
different use. The rent gap, then, is the gap between the current realizable rent and the 
potential rent that could be obtained if the parcel is reconfigured accordingly (ibid., 2015; 
Smith, 1996). This gap is the direct result of the devalorization of buildings over time, 
because as a structure loses value it becomes unable to demand the same rents as it did 
after construction (or during a bubble) (Smith, 1996; Ward and Aalbers, 2016). 
Alternatively, the potential rent could increase (in cases of speculation or increased 
scarcity). It follows then that investors will capitalize on areas with significantly large 
gaps between current and potential rents by investing capital into the built environment, 
thus closing the gap and maximizing profit margins by fully realizing the potential rent 
27 
 
(ibid., 1996, 2016). Rent gap theory has been shown to be intimately linked to both 
gentrification (Lees, Slater and Wyly, 2013; Smith, 1996) and the corresponding capture 
of DR2 reflected in the reinvestment and conversion of relatively cheap parcels of land 
into land uses that yield higher rents (Jaeger, 2003).  
Conceptualizing Modern Rent to Develop Canon 
Much of the work that has gone into developing a robust canon for rent theory has 
generally focused on one or two forms of rent at a time, rather than holistically (all at 
once). In 1990 Haila described three phases in the development of rent theory before 
offering her own proposal for the future of theoretical work (for a lengthy discussion see 
Park, 2014; Ward & Aalbers, 2016). The first was a phase of consensus, where rent was 
generally accepted as a social relation and critical scholars, inspired by Harvey and 
others, turned their focus from differential rent to monopoly and absolute rent (Haila, 
1990; Kerr, 1996). The second phase saw a period of transition, where the class status of 
landowners came into question and consideration of rent’s character as a barrier to 
accumulation was abandoned (ibid., 1990, 1996).  
The 1980s saw a general phase of rupture and two camps of critical scholars in 
rent theory diverged from one another; on the one hand there were those who sought to 
develop universal laws (nomothetic), and on the other hand were scholars like Ball and 
King who sought to only use (and in the most extreme cases, abandon entirely) the 
categories to focus on historically particular social and power relations in a given place 
(Haila, 1990; Jaeger, 2003; Kerr, 1996; King, 1989). In the aftermath, Haila proposed 
rejecting Marx’s categories in favor of focusing on landlord activities, which received 
enormous backlash from Kerr (1996) who claimed that only through elaboration of 
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Marx’s categories could a robust theory of rent (which encapsulate specific relations 
between social actors in given contexts) be developed that explicitly links locally-
contingent land market dynamics into the broader political economy of the city.  
Despite this long period of unrest among scholars there have been significant 
advancements in both the theorization of Marx’s categories and their application to 
different cities around the globe. As mentioned, many of the studies only focus on one or 
two categories of rent at a time. There is still merit, however, in these early studies 
because they inform the overall theory itself on the many ways these categories manifest 
through the interactions of different agents of the landowning class with one another 
across the urban fabric. In what follows I will discuss some of these developments and 
applications. 
DR in the Urban Context 
Differential rent in urban areas has been characterized by Haila (2015) as 
primarily being due to locational advantages of a given parcel of land. This is 
straightforward enough as the bid-rent mechanism in neoclassical economics is primarily 
based on locational advantages and, following Marx, these can be viewed in terms of rent 
based on the intrinsic qualities of the land (quality in this modern context being proximity 
to services, work, attractions, etc., opposed to fertility of the soil). In this sense, city 
parcels closest to certain features may yield higher rents. It is worth noting that the 
monopolistic nature of land as a scarce resource, frequently packaged together with 
symbolic and discursive proclamations of nonsubstitutability, may simultaneously play a 
role in a given parcel’s rent vis-à-vis differential rent. 
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Due to the allure of monopoly and absolute rent in early critical theorizations, 
differential rent was largely ignored apart from the relationships between gentrification 
and DR2 discussed previously. However, several additional applications are worth 
noting. Bryson (1997), for instance, observed in Nottingham’s property market how DR1 
and DR2 were changed through the attempts of developers to close the rent gap. The case 
study showed that in a place where the real estate market is too weak to afford 
redevelopment, developers can tamper with DR2 through the refurbishment of old and 
obsolete buildings (ibid., 1997). Consistent with Marx’s definitions, this confirmed that 
insofar as physical improvements (and thus valorization) become permanent features, an 
increase in DR1, or the amount of rent attributable to the value of the quality of the land, 
thus replaces the temporary increase in DR2 (from initial value of improvements) 
proportionally. Similarly, Baxter’s (2014) study in New Orleans observed that 
government-financed improvements on infrastructure could also allow for increases in 
differential rents to nearby landowners. Unlike Bryson’s observations, however, Baxter’s 
findings are also intimately tied to Walker’s (1974) definition of redistributive rent, 
which will be discussed in further detail later.   
MR in the Urban Context 
In addition to the portion of rent of a given parcel that is attributable to 
differential factors there is also a social relation in rent predicated on the institution of 
private property itself (M. Anderson, 2019; Harvey, 1974; Jaeger, 2003; Ward & Aalbers, 
2016). It follows, then, that rent can be seen arising not only from those advantages 
attributed to differential qualities, but also from the social struggle between landlords and 
tenants, as well as the discursive codes and symbols used to mark a given space as 
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culturally unique, and therefore scarce (Harvey, 2012; Tretter, 2009). The power afforded 
to the landowning class allows them to take advantage of their monopoly over space, i.e., 
when there is a nonsubstitutable aspect involved with a given parcel of land and/or when 
some form of scarcity produces monopoly conditions (M. Anderson, 2019; Haila, 2015; 
Harvey, 2006a, 2012; Park, 2014; Ward & Aalbers, 2016; Wyly et al., 2012). While the 
latter is based on actually existing conditions of scarcity, the former is produced through 
discursive constructions of (a perception of) scarcity.  
AR in the Urban Context 
Development of absolute rent in a modern urban context began with Harvey and 
Chatterjee’s (1974) study in Baltimore in which rents were centered around class conflict 
between landlords and tenants within and between distinct housing submarkets structured 
by financial institutions. Further arguments along the development of the category have 
served to obfuscate the distinct social relation invoked in absolute rent. For instance, 
Lipietz (1982) argued that there was no use in differentiating between the two forms of 
monopoly rent (MR and AR) and that the total rent of a given parcel was only equal to 
the absolute rent plus-or-minus the differential rent. However, he also argued that 
distinguishing between the two may better serve to understand different forms of struggle 
and collaboration among landowners (Jaeger, 2003). For instance, a situation in which a 
landowner charges a company a monopoly rent to drill for oil on her land takes an 
entirely different form than, say, a group of slumlords hiking the rents throughout an 
entire neighborhood in order to maximize their profits. Like Lipietz, Kerr (1996) also 
paid special attention to the relationship between absolute and differential rent in his 
conceptualization of rent. He saw differential rent as both a part of and limiter to absolute 
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rent, as the flow of capital changes geographically over time (ibid., 1996). He fails to 
elaborate on this, though I explore this more fully in the next chapter. Likewise, Jaeger 
(2003) offers an interpretation based on the portion of AR that is seen as “dynamically 
and dialectically influencing monopoly and differential rent” (ibid., p. 240). In other 
words, Jaeger recognizes that all categories may be at play in the context of a given rent, 
and that the bottom line attributable to AR affects the proportions attributable to MR and 
DR. Additionally, M. Anderson (2019) suggests that state property taxes be considered 
AR, as they serve as a tribute from which all landowners must pay their dues for the 
privilege of owning private property. This tribute is derived from the absolute/monopoly 
power held by the state, assuming its role as part of the landowning class. The 
‘reservation-price’ form of AR will be discussed in greater detail below. 
Additional Categories 
Class-Monopoly Rent 
The flourishing new charm of urban political economy in the early 1970s, 
catalyzed by the early work of Harvey and others (cf. Park, 2014; Ward & Aalbers, 
2016), also brought with it new typologies and conceptualizations of rent as geographers 
began applying Marx’s categories to their own studies. At the forefront of this, and in 
growing recent popularity (see for instance, the special session on rentier capitalism at the 
2020 AAG conference), studies have invoked a categorical concept known as class-
monopoly rent to observe and describe the relationships of social struggle and 
institutional power taking place “behind the market” (Jaeger, 2003 p. 238). Class-
monopoly rent (hereafter referred to as CMR) was introduced by Harvey (1974) as a re-
branding of AR to better describe the social struggle involved between classes of 
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landowners and classes of renters in the extraction of absolute rent within isolated 
housing submarkets in Baltimore. In essence, it is identical to Marx’s definition of AR in 
that it is the proportion of rent attributable to the collective action of landowners acting in 
class-interest to seek maximum rents from the renting class (M. Anderson, 2014, 2019; 
Jaeger, 2003; King, 1989; Park, 2014). It is worth noting that the collective action of 
landowners need not be in active collusion with one another so long as landowners are 
individually compelled as a class to follow the same legal strategies of profit 
maximization available to them (M. Anderson, 2014, 2019; Wyly et al., 2012). Insofar as 
they are all guided by the same profit-maximizing imperatives, the aggregate results of 
this individual behavior are not too dissimilar than if they had been actively colluding. 
A special focus on the interactions between different types of landowners, 
financial institutions, and municipalities, all engaged in one way or another in their own 
particular forms of rent-seeking, has been a hallmark of CMR studies in the last decade. 
These studies have not only unveiled ubiquitous racialized and class-based housing 
market discrimination at the behest of the landowning class (Haila, 2015; Wyly et al. 
2009; Wyly et al. 2012), but also offered insights into strategies used in public-private 
partnerships to extract monopoly rents in a multiplicity of forms (Aalbers, 2007; M. 
Anderson, 2014; 2019; Charnock et al. 2014). For instance, in Chicago the city 
government actively worked with developers through land-banking practices, tax-
increment financing (TIF), and place-branding in order to enhance land values and thus 
increase their revenue from rents (to the demise of those displaced from rising rents) 
(ibid., 2014). Similarly, in Portland’s Pearl District, M. Anderson (2019) also shows how 
the collaboration of financial institutions, city government and individual developers, 
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together known as regional growth coalitions, urban regimes, or growth machines 
(Bryson, 1997; Logan and Molotch, 2007), actively cultivate CMR through TIF, zoning 
agreements, and discursive accounts of non-substitutability propagated in the media. 
Charnock et al. (2014) also found the city of Barcelona, Spain, to be engaged in similar 
behavior through their own strategy of value capture financing, and while the authors do 
not explicitly engage in CMR, it is implicit vis-à-vis the collaborative efforts of 
Barcelona’s own growth machines to maximize profits through increased property 
values.  
Furthermore, CMR has been identified as a phenomenon operating “at a variety of 
spatial scales, from the most local to the societal” (King, 1989, p. 449), from the ‘island-
like’ structures of housing submarkets in Baltimore, MD, or Portland, OR, permeating up 
to the (inter)national scale (M. Anderson, 2019; Harvey, 1974; Wyly et al., 2009). 
Moreover, the forms that class-monopoly rents take are contingent on the actors involved 
and the types of rent-seeking they engage in, and in this sense Jaeger (2003) argues that 
CMR may not be so much a category as it is a process by which monopoly rents are 
commanded from renters. It follows, then, that CMR may be considered in terms of 
Marx’s categories as a specific combination of different types of rent that are commanded 
by certain types of rent-seekers operating under certain types of collaborative conditions. 
I will discuss this at greater length toward the end of this chapter.  
Class-monopoly rent was not the only additional category to be introduced by 
geographers between the Marxist revival and now. In what follows I will describe four 
additional categories that have floated along the periphery of theorization. Much like the 
concept of class-monopoly rent, these categories rest upon situational circumstances 
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where certain types of actors belonging to the landowning class may command specific 
types of rents above and beyond the proportions attributable to Marx’s categories. Unlike 
the ‘canonical categories,’ however, most of these additional categories have yet to reach 
full development, and I will argue later for a theorization that allows for the incorporation 
of all categorical concepts.  
Redistributive rent 
Another student of Harvey, Walker (1974), introduced his conceptualization of 
redistributive rent as a way to explain the government’s role in affecting land rents 
through government-allocated services. For example, the construction of a new bridge 
may serve to raise rents (via an increase of land values) on both sides of the bridge, but 
consequently lower rents farther away, hence redistributing the previously existing rents 
from some parcels of land to others (ibid., 1974). However, Park (2014) argues that rather 
than serve as its own category, redistributive rent should be treated as one factor among 
many that influences the major categories. I agree with Park’s position because in the 
case of redistributions of rents, the government is assuming the role as an active agent 
that affects land value by investing in improvements.  
However, in opposition to Park and as will become clear later in this chapter, I 
argue that most of the categories of rent may be influenced by many different types of 
agents simultaneously, and specific combinations of rent-seekers and types of rents may 
produce distinct circumstances that are both geographically generalizable at the small 
scale but contextually specific at the large scale. In the case of Walker’s redistributive 
rent and for a given parcel of land, then, I suggest the redistribution of rents (based on the 
appearance or disappearance of government-provided services) as a particular 
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circumstance in which the government’s actions trigger a specific combination of, at the 
very least, some of the rent categories by the actions of other agents. It is a circumstance 
whereby the state provides the investment landowners are unwilling to make, yet 
nonetheless benefit from by commanding higher levels of what is really a combination of 
DR2 (from the enhanced improvements) and AR (from the potential collaborative actions 
of the state and beneficiary landowners). 
Fiscal, Global, and Derivative Rent  
Haila (2015) summarizes several other categories that have had little, if any, 
inclusion in critical urban studies of rent. First, she identifies fiscal rent as the rent that 
state governments and municipalities may charge for use of state-owned property (ibid., 
2015). However, this may be interpreted as a combination of monopoly and differential 
rents commanded by the state acting as a landowning rent-seeker, rather than a category 
on its own. Second, she identifies global rent as the amount of rent attributable to the 
influence of global capital on real estate (ibid., 2015). In the special cases of international 
developers, for instance, rents (in the form of profits) are often repatriated to their home 
countries rather than contribute to local capital flow (ibid., 2015). Rather than warranting 
global rent its own category, though, the particular agents involved in global rent capture 
are still agents of a global class of landowners nonetheless, and like fiscal and 
redistributive rents, I suggest that global rents are better suited to describe a particular 
circumstance where Marx’s categories are triggered in a configuration contingent on the 
particular actors involved in the particular context.  
The third additional category that Haila (2015) discusses is derivative rent. This is 
based on the financialization of real estate into securities, with the portion of profits from 
36 
 
which the security produces being attributable to derivative rent (ibid., 2015). Little (if 
any) work has invoked derivative rent, although it is implicit in the work by C. Ward 
(2019) and Ward & Swyngedouw (2018) on the mobilization of land through assetization 
and debt-led expansion. This was also potentially at play leading up to the subprime 
mortgage crisis as mortgages were increasingly packaged in securities and other 
financialized forms (Wyly et al. 2009; Wyly et al., 2012). However, I would argue that 
rather than this be a separate category from Marx’s typology, this may be rather 
construed as a form or circumstance of CMR, where assetization is seen as a possible step 
for property owners/producers, financial institutions, and the state acting collaboratively 
in seeking to increase their ‘socially acceptable’ minimum returns (realized as rent, 
interest, and tax revenue respectively) by unlocking and leveraging projected future 
revenue streams as a means of expanding capitalist investment and the circulation and 
accumulation of capital in the built environment. TIF, for instance, represents one such 
circumstance whereby the local state takes on the debt on behalf of the private real-estate 
community (see M. Anderson, 2014, 2019). 
Introducing A New Typology 
Several efforts by geographers have been made since the 1990s to both unify and 
realign rent theory following Haila’s (1990) rupture phase of the previous decade. As 
previously discussed, her original proposal to completely abandon Marx’s categories and 
shift focus instead onto landlords was not particularly well received (Kerr, 1996; Bryson, 
1997). One of Kerr’s (1996, p. 60) primary arguments was that landlord activities, along 
with other current events within a given property market, could only be “render[ed] 
intelligible” by applying and expanding Marx’s categories. Indeed, King (1989, p. 448) 
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claimed that Marx’s categories were only useful through their application to show the 
“complexities of… various and changing social relations.” Both Bryson (1997) and 
Jaeger (2003) likewise argued that theory should synthesize the ‘dogma’ of Marxian rent 
theory with the ideographic focus on landowners. Jaeger (2003) particularly criticized the 
lack of consistent typology within research that kept theory subdued from achieving any 
quantitative robustness. As a solution to these problems he offered his own 
reconceptualization of rent through a regulationist perspective, arguing for a separation of 
MR into two categories based on whether rising rents are paid out of surplus value or 
actively reduce wages (MR1 and MR2, respectively) to shed light on situational conflicts 
between the class of landowners and the class of renters (ibid., 2003). This distinction 
falls flat, however, as Jaeger fails to fully distinguish how these two forms of MR are 
played out in the context of his case studies in Montevideo and Vienna and, ultimately, 
lumps them together as MR in his final synopsis.  
The problematic of a more developed theory of rent that incorporates attention to 
the activities of the landowning class in conjunction with Marx’s categories has yet to be 
resolved. Kerr (1996) speaks to this problem in that much of the work done in both 
ideographic and nomothetic approaches to land rent theory have tended to miss the 
important insights that the opposing approaches produce. In what follows I present a new 
framework for analysis that applies the rent categories in a way that sheds light on the 
interlaced relations between the categorical forms of rent, the types of actors involved in 
the collection of rents, and the existing circumstances that arise in particular contextually 
specific combinations of these relationships in order to unify both ideographic and 
nomothetic camps of rent theory. This is not to discredit the large body of work that has 
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come before this. Indeed, without decades of research that has embraced and developed 
rent theory to this point, a more robust conceptualization of rent would not be possible. I 
suggest in this approach that while Ward and Aalbers (2016) point to the fact that rents 
are paid in lump sums, and the amounts that go to each category are therefore empirically 
indistinguishable, the exact quantitative proportions of rent sliced off by each category 
may in fact be unimportant. Rather, the value of the categories lies in their ability to 
illuminate the socio-economic relations that each category represents as well as the 
particular behavior of capital flow in a given built environment and the forms of social 
struggle that unfold between the landowner and renter classes.   
The Rents, As Variables  
To begin, I would like to first focus on which categories of rent fit into a new 
typology. As alluded to in the previous section, I believe that most of the categories that 
have been suggested peripheral to Marx’s main categories may be better described as 
circumstances in a given socio-spatial context. Therefore, I will use the differential and 
monopoly categories in a similar way to previous conceptualizations by Jaeger (2003) 
and others. I will not, however, distinguish between Jaeger’s definitions of MRI and MR2 
as I am more focused on the overall relationships between monopoly rents and other 
forms of rent. The distinction between the two may be useful in certain situations, and 
this framework is certainly elastic enough for such incorporations. I will otherwise use 
the original definitions of each category: the qualitative/physical advantages of DR1 and 
DR2, the factors of scarcity and nonsubstitutability of monopoly (and oligopoly) rents 
(both by physical state and as a product of social discourse), and the production of 
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artificial scarcity (and profit-maximization) vis-à-vis class collusion that are attributable 
to absolute rents. I have summarized these categories as variables in Table 1.  
Table 1 
Rent Categories as Variables 
 
Type of Rent 
 
Symbol 
Total Rent R 
Differential Rent I DR1 
Differential Rent II DR2 
Monopoly Rent MR 
Absolute Rent AR 
 
 
In the following variable format, the relationships between the different categories 
are more easily visualized, and the total rent paid for a given parcel of land can be seen as 
the total sum of the portions attributable to each category: 
𝑅 = 𝐷𝑅1 + 𝐷𝑅2 + 𝑀𝑅 + 𝐴𝑅    (1) 
where R is the total rent paid as a lump sum. It is important to note that any given 
variable may be equal to 0 depending on the particular circumstances of rent extraction 
for a given situation. For example, if a hypothetical building is 50 years old and has not 
had any additional capital invested to improve its physical conditions to cause rents to be 
raised, then we could assume that DR2 is zero, and thus R = DR1 + MR + AR.  
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The Actors, As Subscripts 
This method alone is insufficient to describe the complex social interactions at 
play in rent appropriation, however, and as such it needs to be modified further to reflect 
the different behaviors among different actors in the landowning class that allow each 
party within that class to claim a certain portion of the total rent for themselves. After all, 
as Harvey (2006) states,  
“landowners receive rent, developers receive increments in rent on the basis of 
improvements, builders5 earn profit of enterprise, financiers provide money 
capital in return for interest at the same time as they can capitalize any form of 
revenue accruing from use of the built environment into fictitious capital6 
(property price), and the state can use taxes (present or anticipated) as backing 
for investments which capital cannot or will not undertake but which 
nevertheless expand the basis for local circulation of capital. These roles exist no 
matter who fills them” (p. 395, original emphasis).  
The roles Harvey refers to are those exact roles in rent extraction that critical scholars 
have called for to address the landlord activities involved in the property market (cf. 
Bryson, 1997; Haila, 1990; Jaeger, 2003). We can thus reconcile the dichotomy between 
nomothetic and idiographic theorizations by attaching the roles that different actors play 
directly to the categories that they influence and personify. The actors of the landowning 
class that I choose to acknowledge here are based solely on Harvey’s abstraction (above) 
and therefore do not necessarily represent a comprehensive list of all possible actors 
 
5 While the increase in permanent value that is the result of the actual construction process (DR2) may 
contribute to the amount of rent commanded for its use, it is argued that the only profits that builders make 
are based solely on the surplus value generated from construction labor and not from rents paid after 
construction. Even if the total amount given to them via a contract with the developers/landowners are paid 
with previously accumulated rents, they do not receive future rents from the projects they complete and are 
therefore not considered as landowning agents hereafter.   
6 While I do not explicitly engage with fictitious capital in this chapter, I generally agree with Christophers 
(2016) that the concept of ‘fictitious’ capital only serves as a confusing barrier to the development of a 
robust theorization of capital flow and disables any effective engagement critical scholars may have with 
mainstream economists. For the sake of simplicity and to render the conceptual framework as an applicable 
model, I adopt Harvey’s alternative reference to the property price, as this is the value that banks trade titles 
based upon.  
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involved in any context of rent extraction. These are nevertheless summarized in Table 2, 
with the express understanding that this may be expanded upon in future empirical work.  
Table 2 







Types of Rent 
Landowners L MRL, ARL, DR1L, DR2L,  
Developers D MRD, ARD, DR1D, DR2D,  
Financiers F MRF, ARF, DR1F, DR2F,  
State S MRS, ARS, DR1S, DR2S 
 
 
Landowners generally may command rents in all their forms due to the 
monopolistic power afforded to them by the institution of private property. This is 
especially true when they own land that contains a precious physical or cultural resource, 
allowing a certain portion of the rent to be attributable to MR. They may also command 
DR1 through the locational advantages of their parcel(s), DR2 through redeveloping or 
refurbishing, and AR by seeking rents that are similar to other landowners in the area. 
While developers are able to extract many of the same types of rent as landowners 
(sometimes the developers are also the landowners), the ways in which they accomplish 
the rent extraction process are different, in whole or in part. For one, developers increase 
the value of the land through building and modification to both a given building site and 
42 
 
to the surrounding infrastructure, invoking DR2 (which may increase DR1 for 
landowners elsewhere). Similar to other landowners, they also may claim a certain 
portion of rents based on locational advantages, invoking DR1. To the extent that 
developers brand their projects as unique and nonsubstitutable, a certain portion of the 
rent may be considered a tribute to MR. Insofar as developers cooperate with other actors 
(either developers and/or other kinds of rent-seekers) to increase their respective rents, 
another portion of the total rent may be attributable to AR.  
Having the most power to affect changes on the land and to appropriate rents (as 
interest) in various forms, financial institutions are hierarchically situated at the very top 
of capital mobility and thus claims to rent (Harvey, 1974). Indeed, financiers have the 
monetary capabilities to loan capital to any other type of landowning agent: by laying out 
interest-bearing capital for developers, for instance, they stake a claim on the future rents 
that those investments produce, in the form of interest. The interest itself can be seen as a 
form of AR because it is, essentially, the reservation price for the privilege of having the 
loan. The interest on mortgages for homeowners can be seen in the same respect: the 
reservation price is tied to the interest rate. Additionally, insofar as the agents that 
financiers have loaned to are engaged in monopoly and differential rent appropriation, so 
too is the interest that is ultimately paid directly back to the financial institutions, which 
automatically (arguably) implicates AR insofar as the profit maximizing interests of both 
financial institutions and property owners/producers are aligned: what’s good for 
investors is good for developers, and vice versa. 
The state’s role in claiming a certain portion of the rent of a given parcel is played 
out in several ways. First, the state may claim monopoly rents and differential rents like 
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any other. To the extent that the state actively collaborates with other actors (i.e., 
developers, financiers) to produce coded symbols of nonsubstitutability in a given 
housing sub-market, it (along with the other agents involved) may realize a portion of 
AR/MR as well. However, unlike other actors in the landowning class, the state has an 
absolute monopoly over all land, and thus demands payment for all uses of all land 
through property taxes, particularly in the United States. As M. Anderson (2019) 
suggests, taxes serve as a reservation price for the protection of private property rights 
and may thus be considered a form of AR. Furthermore, the state’s use of tax laws to 
benefit other landowners/investors (i.e., through tax-increment financing) not only 
increase various forms of rent that go to such landowners/investors, but also increases the 
portion of rents attributable to AR insofar as the land redeveloped under TIFs increase the 
tax revenues derived from that land; taxes whose payment responsibility are often 
transferred from the landowner to the renter.  
From the roles that different agents play in commanding rent, individually or in 
conjunction with one another, it follows that by attaching agency to the categorical 
variables of rent we can expand our understanding of the relations of rent at any scale – 
from the local behaviors of the landowning class to the regional influences of the state 
and other actors (i.e., global financial institutions) on the appropriation of (surplus) 
values through rent. From these, an expanded form of (1) can be generated: 
𝑅 = 𝑀𝑅𝐿 + 𝐴𝑅𝐿 + 𝐷𝑅1𝐿 + 𝐷𝑅2𝐿 + 𝑀𝑅𝐷 + 𝐴𝑅𝐷 + 𝐷𝑅1𝐷 + 𝐷𝑅2𝐷 + 𝑀𝑅𝐹 + 𝐴𝑅𝐹 +
𝐷𝑅1𝐹 + 𝐷𝑅2𝐹 + 𝑀𝑅𝑆 + 𝐴𝑅𝑆 + 𝐷𝑅1𝑆 +  𝐷𝑅2𝑆    (2) 
This equation only holds so long as any variable can be equal to zero, depending 
on the situation. Furthermore, by narrowing down these variables we can begin to 
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observe the underlying characteristic patterns of certain on-the-ground situations, or 
circumstances, that describe the alternative categories introduced by Haila (2015), 
Walker (1974), and Harvey (1974). It is important to note, however, that multiple 
circumstances may be at play simultaneously, and it is therefore up to empirical analysis 
to qualitatively separate them into intelligible distinctions that help understand not only 
the flow of capital through the built environment, but its production of social struggle 
through the dynamics of power as well.  
While it may indeed be impossible to quantitatively separate these variables into 
discrete portions, the power in this framework lies in the ability to further decipher, 
through critical examination, the existence of multiple forms of rent in a given locality 
within the broader accumulation and circulation of capital. In this way it sheds light on 
the political economy of distinct property markets more generally. Only by applying the 
formula in particular empirical contexts can we begin to identify the existence of more 
generalized patterns of particular configurations of rent-seeker relationships that may be 
at work across socio-spatial contexts, thereby accounting for both the individual and 
contextually-specific actions of rent-seekers and the broader generalizable characteristics 
their behavior potentially embodies. In short, it is through the empirical application of the 
formula that I suggest the nomothetic and ideographic approaches can be sensibly fused. 
Fiscal rents, for instance, can be seen as the specific configuration of variables 
where the total rents claimed by the state for the use of state-owned property are a 
combination of DR and MR, or in other words, FR (fiscal rent) = DR1S + MRS. Global 
rents can be construed as a combination of DRx and MRx, where x represents individual 
landowners, developers, or financial institutions (or any combination of these actors) 
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operating and competing in the global real estate market. Likewise, redistributive rents 
can be interpreted as a combination of DR2L in concert with the resulting increase in tax 
revenue claimed by the state (ARS) which is attributable to certain investments in 
infrastructural improvements facilitated by the state. 
Class-monopoly rent, then, the particular circumstance of rent extraction that is at 
the focus of this thesis, may now be considered. Throughout its historical use and 
application, there have been no definitional or theoretical differences between CMR and 
AR. I propose that it is more empirically valuable, however, to consider CMR as a 
relational circumstance that is the aggregate sum of AR appropriation by each actor 
acting in collaboration: it is a circumstance that reflects the outcome of a combination of 
different kinds of social actors all engaging in mutually beneficial ways (i.e., 
limiting/reducing supply) that maximize the rents for all who participate (at the expense 
of the renting class). Following M. Anderson (2014, 2019), the appropriation of CMR in 
cities is increasingly achieved through Logan and Molotch’s (2007) growth machine 
formations, the ‘unholy trinity’ comprised of developers, financial institutions and state 
agencies all working together as a mode of urban governance to promote economic 
growth; a growth that only serves to benefit the growth machines themselves as a class of 
rent-seekers. In its most general form then,  
𝐶𝑀𝑅 =  𝐴𝑅𝐿 + 𝐴𝑅𝐷 + 𝐴𝑅𝐹 + 𝐴𝑅𝑆     (3) 
where the amount of the total rent that is attributable to these particular circumstances is 
equal to the collective sum of landowners, developers, financiers, and state agencies all 
appropriating AR simultaneously. Much like in (2), any one of these factors need not be 
present for class-monopoly conditions to be present, and the total rent R will be the total 
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sum of CMR plus all other forms of rent that are present at a given place or a given scale 
at a particular point in time. 
In the case of CMR at the national scale, identified by Wyly et al. (2009) as a key 
factor in housing discrimination through predatory subprime mortgage lending, the 
culmination of state, financial institutions and individual landowners acting as a class to 
maximize their own profits led to a de facto state of class-monopoly. Therefore, 
following Wyly et al. (2009), 
𝐶𝑀𝑅𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 =  𝐴𝑅𝐿 + 𝐴𝑅𝐹 + 𝐴𝑅𝑆    (4) 
where the total rent attributable to a class-monopoly at the national scale is equivalent to 
the collective extraction of AR by individual landowners, financiers, and state agencies 
(although we can expand this analysis to include the role developers played in producing 
the pre-2008 housing bubble as well, though this dynamic is beyond the scope of Wyly’s 
study).  
It is through this framework that I will investigate the neighborhoods of SLU and 
Belltown in Seattle. These neighborhoods have seen an intense generation of 
redevelopment and discursive codifying as exclusive sites of luxury. By investigating the 
interactions between Seattle’s elite urban regime, the circumstances of rent appropriation 








The Production of the Unholy Trinity in Seattle 
This chapter provides a historical background of SLU and its immediate 
surroundings in order to understand the full context of this neighborhood’s ongoing 
redevelopment, and the role of Amazon in establishing the terms and conditions for 
extracting CMR in SLU.  As such, I construct a narrative based on the news media’s 
portrayal of SLU’s recent history, complimented with the employment of a critical 
discourse analysis that not only examines the historical development of SLU into what it 
is today, but also investigates how Amazon’s behavior has influenced developers’ ability 
to extract CMR in Seattle. From the beginning of a capitalist’s dream for SLU twenty 
years ago to the full realization of that dream today, Seattle’s growth machine has 
continuously engaged in neoliberal-guided policies that have placed capital on a glorified 
pedestal while making it increasingly harder for residents to afford their homes. At the 
same time, active collaboration between the City and developers have allowed the City to 
increase their tax revenues (or ARS) while allowing developers the opportunity to 
collectively maximize rents (ARD). 
Qualitative Methods 
As mentioned, the proportions of rent attributable to any specific rent category 
cannot be measured quantitatively because rents are paid in lump sums. Consequently, 
implications of class-monopoly circumstances can only be assessed via qualitative 
methods. I therefore employ critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2003) to this end by 
deconstructing the discourse used in news media and other authoritative platforms to 
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illuminate the motivations and actions of Seattle’s growth machine in relation to 
Amazon’s own agendas. According to Fairclough (2003, p. 9), the “ideological effects. . . 
of texts in inculcating and sustaining” hegemonic conditions and practices are of major 
importance in understanding the various “modalities of power” (ibid., 2003, p. 9) through 
which entities like Amazon regularly operate. Texts can refer to language in general, 
whether in spoken or written form. Critical discourse analysis thus seeks to analyze the 
language used by actors at any level that serves to both justify and reify the ideological 
content operating within the speaker’s worldview. As Fairclough (2003, p. 11) points out, 
“what is ‘said’ in a text always rests upon ‘unsaid’ assumptions.” Accordingly, critical 
discourse analysis seeks to unveil those assumptions by exploring the situated meanings 
that underlie particular constellations of discourse (ibid., 2003; Gee, 1999).  
Further, critical discourse analysis is inherently subjective as there is no way to 
objectively interpret the assumptions and meanings involved with text (Fairclough, 
2003). I therefore do not offer my own interpretations as objective truth, but rather as 
evidence in the form of a ‘constructive narrative’ (Fairclough, 2003) that presents and 
analyzes the (c)overt motivations and intentions guiding the behavior of the rent-seekers 
identified in this study, especially with respect to the circumstances of CMR operating in 
Seattle’s SLU. 
Both the critical discourse analysis and narrative form of presentation were 
informed by the data collected via a thorough search of the NexisUni for all news articles 
and other media pertaining to rent, Amazon, and development in SLU and Belltown, as 
well as in Seattle generally. This resulted in a database of roughly 250 documents. I also 
analyzed approximately two dozen government documents from www.seattle.gov, policy 
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documents from the Puget Sound Regional Council (PSRC) (www.psrc.org), the Rental 
Housing Association of Washington (www.rhawa.org), and the Washington Multi-
Family Housing Association (www.smfhaorg). Data gathered through these methods 
were used to produce a contextual narrative through which the analysis flows; however, 
these data were also analyzed specifically using a codification scheme based on the 
general formula for class monopoly rent (3).  
Adopting the methods for qualitative research discussed by Strauss (1987), that is, 
considering the dialectical relation between incoming data and all data previously 
gathered, I was able to discern common patterns of language used by various media 
authors that may be attributed to the various forms of AR. Specifically, certain phrases 
and attributes of properties that discursively painted those properties in ways that allow 
property owners to not only claim but enhance reservation pricing were coded as ARD, 
ARL, and ARS, depending on the context. Further evidence of anticompetitive behaviors 
among landowners were also coded as AR, with the subscripts coded depending on 
context, as before. This allowed me to isolate data from the nearly 300 textual documents 
as a means of identifying and critically analyzing their situated meanings, particularly the 
underlying agendas and motivations that rationalize the ‘minimum acceptable’ returns on 
rents that landowners claim via their class-monopoly of SLU’s housing submarket.  
Before comprehensively exploring the historical (re)development of SLU and its 
surroundings, it is imperative to understand the hegemonic forces that serve as guiding 
political and economic principles in the contemporary city. Hidden in plain sight, these 
economic rationalizations serve as the ‘guiding hand’ of the free market and govern all 
policies enacted by local governments. An understanding of neoliberalism is therefore a 
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necessary precursor to presenting the analysis of SLUs redevelopment, as it is not only 
the discursive framework through which the City has fueled this redevelopment, but it is 
also the framework through which property owners/producers have set the terms and 
conditions for realizing AR.  
Neoliberal Hegemony and Corporate Governmentality 
The political-economic system in the United States continues to be shaped by 
neoliberalism, the now globally dominant (and hegemonic) political ideology that has 
marked the past four decades of political and economic restructuring and social 
governance. The literature on the neoliberalization of governance is now extensive and 
well documented (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Harvey, 1989, 2005; Keil, 2009; Larner 
2000; Peck & Tickell, 2002). However, it is not only an ideological framework, but also a 
process of governance transformation (justified via neoliberal principles) that unfolds at 
multiple scales to better serve the accumulation of capital. These transformations pivot 
around laissez-faire policy prescriptions that are purportedly guided by the ‘invisible 
hand’ of the market and effectively provide new arenas for capital circulation and 
accumulation through increasing modes of financialization, privatization, and market 
deregulation (Harvey, 2006b). The process of neoliberalization has broadly unfolded 
through three phases that are treated by Keil (2009, p. 232) as both “simultaneous and 
interactive,” known generally as “roll-back,” “roll-out,” and “roll-with-it” 
neoliberalization.  
In the roll-back phase, pre-existing ‘welfare-state” socio-political configurations 
are destroyed and reconfigured around neoliberal principles of marketization, 
privatization, deregulation, and the supposed economic independence (and responsibility) 
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of the individual. In the aftermath of its roll-back of extant configurations, its roll-out 
phase seeks to establish political and economic policy that is guided more so by 
neoliberal principles (rather than welfare-state, or Keynesian) that are friendly to capital 
accumulation. However, and as discussed at length by Peck and Tickell (2002), the way 
that roll-out occurs in the built environment is contingent upon the way that capital has 
historically flowed through the urban fabric. As new buildings are erected and 
immobilized in space, they eventually create barriers (precisely because of this inherent 
fixity) to the potential for continued accumulation in and around them (Smith, 1996; 
Weber, 2002), thus creating certain path-dependencies and contradictions that necessarily 
must be navigated and eventually overcome via new cycles of creative destruction, or 
through more subtle means of reconfiguring institutional governance regimes, such as 
reforming policy that previously hindered accumulation.  
In the roll-with-it phase, generally coming after roll-back and roll-out, and usually 
referring to the post-Great Recession period, neoliberal policies and practices are rolled-
out in response, ironically, to the contradictions of pre-existing roll-out neoliberal 
configurations (rather than the Keynesian welfare-state). Continued neoliberal policy 
reformation, when building upon extant neoliberal configurations, tendentially supersedes 
those configurations with new policy formations that only deepen their impacts (and 
ensuing contradictions). This is characterized as roll-with-it neoliberalization and is 
symptomatic of a well-trained and self-disciplined population vis-à-vis a form of ‘shadow 
governance’ known as neoliberal governmentality. 
Governmentality is a term introduced by Foucault (1991) that represents the 
various strategies used by institutional state powers to indoctrinate a population of self-
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governing subjects through the propagation of ideologically produced knowledge and 
political rationalities. The notion of “neoliberal governmentality” thus describes a state of 
affairs whereby this mode of ideological knowledge production is informed by 
neoliberalism as the guiding force of capitalist political economy (Lemke, 2001). 
Moreover, according to Keil (2009, p. 239), “neoliberal governmentality has been 
generalized to the point that it does not have to be established aggressively through an 
explicit policy of roll-back and roll-out.” This is because the ethos of neoliberalism has 
been the dominant discourse for four decades, and as such its ideologues have 
disseminated its principles from the hierarchically topmost position of global financial 
institutions, percolating down through the state and into the mind of the supposedly 
‘rational’ individual. Neoliberal governmentality, then, has succeeded insofar as it has 
sought to reify a systemic belief system that holds that neoliberalism is ‘natural’ and has 
always existed (Lemke, 2001). Roll-with-it neoliberalization continues to fuel economic 
growth in cities through the implicit assumption of TINA (“there is no alternative”), 
naturalized through decades of prioritizing competitiveness for the attraction of global 
capital (Peck and Tickell, 2002).  
In short, due to the persistence of neoliberal hegemony and the utter evisceration 
of leftist, socialist imaginaries in the mainstream American consciousness in the latter-
half of the Twentieth Century, little in the way of innovative pathways exist in the 
dominant ideological landscape of America to point policy makers in decidedly non-
neoliberal directions as a means of resolving crises (whether it be housing affordability, 
homelessness, etc.). Thus, policy makers are seen to adopt a certain “zombie-like” 
approach to reform (Peck, 2010), where actions and decisions are severed from one’s 
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fully-functioning mind, thereby leaving policy makers with, quite literally, no alternative 
than the very same kinds of policies that generated such crises to begin with. Where 
neoliberalism emerged in response to the crisis of the welfare-state in the 1970s, nothing 
has necessarily emerged in response to the past two decades of neoliberal-generated crisis 
conditions other than the further entrenchment of neoliberal-guided practices. 
Further, neoliberalization unfolds through urban landscapes via the growth and 
redevelopment such policies and practices serve to facilitate. This growth and 
redevelopment are brought about by constant collaboration between various actors, both 
institutional and individual, behaving as capital incarnate (or personified), whether they 
wittingly seek to play this role or not. Agents representing financial institutions, 
government officials, and real estate developers play some of the biggest roles in fueling 
this growth – a particular sociopolitical configuration known as the “urban growth 
machine,” or sometimes referred to as growth coalitions or urban regimes (Bryson, 1997; 
Logan & Molotch, 2007).  
Since federal funding to city governments was systematically cut during the 
1980s (justified as a form of welfare retreat), city governments have been forced, or 
‘disciplined,’ into having to procure their own revenue streams. As such, city 
governments now must prioritize growth that attracts capital, people (with middle- to 
upper-income jobs), and resources back to the city, which has meant serving private 
sector capitalist interests (i.e., local real estate, retail, and business communities) as a 
means of resuscitating revenue streams. The collaborating parties that serve these 
interests, though many competing with one another at the local scale, have the propensity 
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of setting competition aside in order to achieve overall successful growth, especially 
when cities undergo large-scale redevelopment projects (M. Anderson, 2019).  
In Seattle, redevelopment in SLU has largely been achieved through an 
entrepreneurial cooperation between the Seattle City Council and a handful of 
developers. Insofar as financial institutions are a necessary tool for the metamorphosis of 
the built environment, they are also implicated as fundamentally involved in this 
redevelopment (as their profit streams are also contingent on successful development 
projects as investors). However, through the process of building a narrative of 
redevelopment in SLU, little documentation was found that directly brought them into the 
limelight: the role of financial institutions often lurks behind the curtain of dominant 
media portrayals. Nonetheless, financial investors are an integral component in 
facilitating gentrification processes, including the transformation of SLU from an 
increasingly obsolete urban neighborhood into a powerhouse for capital accumulation. 
The strategies employed by the City and one developer in particular, Vulcan, the real 
estate arm of Microsoft co-creator Paul Allen’s capital enterprise, have consisted of roll-
with-it strategies that have engendered ensuing rounds of creative destruction in ways 
that have not only attracted global capital, but have maximized returns on investment for 
Vulcan as well as other developers, financial institutions, and the City alike.  
Simultaneously, Amazon, now a giant megacorporation, has taken residence 
within this neighborhood and has served to both enhance the fortunes of the growth 
machine while concomitantly bending it to the company’s will through particular forms 
of ‘corporate activism.’ During this period, the corporate megalith launched a nationwide 
bidding-war for the company’s second HQ. To the extent that the behavior and language 
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used by Amazon can be seen as ‘disciplining’ the city (and other cities) to behave in a 
way that is beneficial to Amazon and other large corporations, this can be viewed, I 
suggest, following Ward and Swyngedouw (2018), as an increasingly key ingredient to 
the often neglected ‘meso-scale’ mechanics of neoliberal governmentality, the 
connective-tissue between the more commonly examined local and national scales. 
However, recent events in Seattle also offer a case of hope for alternatives to 
continued roll-with-it neoliberalization through grassroots resistance to Amazon’s efforts 
to establish explicit dominance as a political force (in Seattle in particular and the world 
economy in general), also an increasing phenomenon (Przybylinski, 2020) and attribute 
of the last decade of roll-with-it neoliberalization. As such, the study also explores how 
existing hegemonic conditions can potentially be challenged and even reformed – the 
‘right to the city’ (Mitchell, 2003) is yet a possibility within achievable grasp, as TINA 
discourse may no longer be as readily accepted.  
In what follows I will describe and analyze many of the roll-with-it policies the 
City has adapted at the request of Vulcan over the last twenty years, as well as Amazon’s 
role as a powerful political entity leading up to its failed effort to buy the Council election 
in 2019. The analysis then considers how the City’s roll-with-it policies relate to 
neoliberal governmentality and land rent theory more generally. This is followed by a 
critical examination of the discursive rationalization of CMR in SLU and how Amazon 
has empowered landowners to maximize their profits from rents through its own refusal 
to adopt City measures that would otherwise help reduce rents by making Seattle a more 




Roll-With-It, Seattle: A Historical Look at Seattle (2000 - Present) 
South Lake Union is one of Seattle’s oldest neighborhoods and home to the city’s 
oldest park, nestled between the neighborhoods of Belltown and Queen Anne to the west, 
Capitol Hill to the east, Lake Union to its north and the downtown business core to the 
south (Figure 1). Throughout the twentieth century working class residents living in the 
neighborhood were primarily situated along a small residential strip adjacent to Capitol 
Hill called Cascade, and the rest of the neighborhood was used for mills, laundries and 
Navy shipbuilding along the lake (Seattle Department of Planning, 2007). As neighboring 
downtown Seattle grew with high-rise condos and office towers over the latter half of the 
twentieth century, SLU lagged behind – in 1998, 35% of its land use was light industry 
with only 3% reserved for residential homes (Seattle Department of Planning, 1998). 
Designated an urban village and bounded by heavily used transportation corridors 
(excluding the lake itself), the growth strategies the City established in the ‘90s were 
focused not only on increasing employment and housing in the area, but more 
importantly, preserving the historic character of the neighborhood (Seattle City Council, 
1994; Seattle Department of Planning, 1998).  
Side-by-side with community plans focused on cultural preservation, plans for 
South Lake Union, as it is today, were being dreamed by Paul Allen’s Vulcan, Inc., one 
of Seattle’s most notorious commercial and residential developers. The third richest man 
in the world at the end of the twentieth century (Masters, 1999), Allen invested much of 
his wealth back into his home city, including a $20 million loan to the city in 1996 to 
purchase what would be called the Seattle Commons. Upon voter rejection of the 
proposal, the land was returned to Vulcan. Vulcan bounced back from the rejection by 
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purchasing more lakefront property in SLU, and with that land began to envision a high-
tech hub for biomedical research, complete with mixed housing, retail, office towers and 
open cultural spaces (Associated Press, 1999; Business Wire, 2002).  
A Partnership between Vulcan and the Mayor 
In 2001 Mayor Nickels entered the scene, and by his second day in office Vulcan 
was already sending representatives to prime him as a corporate tool for their grand plan 
for SLU (Mulady, 2004c). The mayor, excited by the opportunity to attract global capital 
to the city, quickly stepped on board with their vision. Shortly following this Vulcan 
agreed to buy land from the City at a discounted rate of $20 million, contingent on the 
City’s commitment to spend an additional $15 million on infrastructure (Young & 
McOmber, 2003). By 2002, Vulcan owned a total of 50 acres in SLU (Business Wire, 
2002) and had close ties with various neighborhood boards (McOmber & Young, 2003), 
including a seat on the South Lake Union Friends and Neighbors (SLUFAN) 
neighborhood coalition (M. Ward, 2012). On behalf of Vulcan’s interests, in April 2003 
the mayor proposed to the City Council a $570 million investment of public funds to be 
allocated to redevelopment along Vulcan’s planned biotech campus, specifically to fix 
what was called the “Mercer Mess”: a highly congested traffic route that connects SLU to 
I-5 in the northeast corner of the neighborhood (McOmber & Young, 2003; Young & 
McOmber, 2003). Despite the high risks of investing such a large amount in a ‘vision’, 
the City Council passed Vulcan and Nickels’ proposal, fearing that the City might lose 
out on the financial rewards should they refuse to comply (Young, 2003; Young & 
McOmber, 2003); rewards upon which city governments have generally become 
dependent in the neoliberal epoch.  
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Complying with the biotech vision, the City also offered three different tax breaks 
as incentives for biotech firms to move into SLU (Young, 2003). Later that year, the City 
considered another $500 million infrastructure investment as well as zoning changes in 
SLU to help Vulcan continue building their biotech campus (Mulady, 2003a). Rezoning 
was highly contested by neighborhood coalitions outside of Vulcan’s purview, who 
warned against resident displacement and pressed the Council to delay the rezones. 
Vulcan condemned these coalitions, arguing instead that delays in rezones would give the 
competitive edge to other cities trying to lure in biotech firms, despite little evidence to 
support these claims (ibid., 2003a). Nevertheless, the delays were granted, and Nickels 
frantically released several reports over the next few months projecting millions of 
dollars in future revenue and thousands of jobs that would be brought in by Vulcan’s 
requested upzones (Mulady, 2003b, 2004a). The projects were eventually approved, and 
in 2004 further collaboration between Vulcan (who now owned 60 acres in SLU) and the 
City resulted in Council approval to fix the 20-year-problem that was the Mercer Mess – 
despite City-funded reports that claimed the infrastructure improvements would not help 
congestion, and in blatant disregard for much needed improvements to outdated bridges 
elsewhere in the city (Mulady, 2004b; Young, 2004).  
These collaborative efforts between the City, the private interests of Vulcan, and 
SLUFAN, led to the promotion of SLU to the status of Urban Center in 2004. The older 
plans written by Cascade community members to preserve the historical character of the 
community were now officially abandoned to make way for the Vulcan-Nickels vision of 
a state-of-the-art hub for biotech and other high-tech industries (Seattle Department of 
Planning, 2007; M. Ward, 2012). Over the next several years SLU slowly began to 
59 
 
transform into a realized form of this dream, pushing more public-private partnerships 
that produced funding for a SLU Streetcar and a SLU waterfront park (Mulady, 2004d; 
US State News, 2005, 3/17), as well as drawing in big biotech firms around the Fred 
Hutchinson Cancer Research campus along the waterfront. Vulcan wasn’t the only 
developer on the scene: Alexandria Real Estate, now one of the top landowners in the 
neighborhood, has since constructed a massive biotech campus north of the Fred 
Hutchinson campus. It is important to stress the role of the City’s infrastructural 
investments and zoning revisions in enhancing the value (and profit margins) of such 
redevelopment projects for the primary developers operating in SLU, effectively ensuring 
that Vulcan and Co. received their socially accepted minimum (see Bryson, 1997; 
Charnock et al., 2014). 
Amazon and an Emerging Affordability Crisis 
Amazon entered the scene in 2007 through a contract with Vulcan for the 
development of 1.6 million square feet of office space for their new campus in SLU (and 
nearby Denny Triangle) (Pryne, 2007; Young, 2007). Vulcan once again pushed the 
Council for changes in height restrictions, with the council allowing Amazon’s campus to 
have 160ft buildings in exchange for a $5 million contribution by Vulcan for affordable 
housing (Young, 2007). By this time, average rents in Seattle were $1,000/month (Global 
Broadcast Database, 2007), with many rents doubling as the housing bubble grew prior to 
its collapse (Westneat, 2007). Following the housing bubble collapse and the beginning 
of the Great Recession in 2008, rents in Seattle jumped another 10% as foreclosed 
homeowners entered the rental market, thus increasing demand for rentable units 
(Armour, 2008; Hodges, 2008). The economic downturn did not affect development in 
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SLU, however, because developers like Vulcan were working with cash, rather than 
credit (and had the necessary resources to withstand vacant units for an indefinite period 
of time), rendering this particular sub-market an insulated pocket more or less severed 
from the broader financial collapse. 
By 2011, the accelerated growth that accompanied Amazon’s establishment 
surpassed the growth projections for development in SLU by 200% (Targeted News 
Service, 2011). A year later Amazon’s campus spanned 11 buildings with a total purchase 
price of nearly $1.2 billion (National Real Estate Investor, 2012). Attracted by Amazon’s 
dazzling towers and cutting-edge, pedestrian-friendly campus, 2012 witnessed continued 
growth at an accelerated rate by other major developers, including Alexandria Real 
Estate, Greystar, Equity Residential, and others. In fact, construction permits issued 
between 2011 and 2015 account for nearly a quarter of all parcels within the study area 
(Figure 3). In terms of actual surface area, this was equivalent to 23% of all developable 
land within the focus area that was given approval for redevelopment within that 5-year 
span.7 Between 2016 and 2018 an additional 16% of all developable land was cleared for 
redevelopment, bringing the total amount to 72% of developable land cleared for 





7 By developable land I mean land within parcel boundaries defined by the City of Seattle, which does not 




Redevelopment of SLU and Belltown, 1996 to Present 
 
As previously noted, this new and emergent housing throughout SLU and its 
adjacent neighborhoods has primarily targeted employees for Amazon and other workers 
with salaries around $100,000 (Day, 2018; Jacobs, 2019; Rosenberg, 2018). While 
Vulcan and other top-tier developers’ transformation of SLU created space for new 
research labs and big technology-based corporations (Amazon, Facebook, Google and 
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Microsoft, to name a few), over 75,000 new jobs and 87,000 new residents flocked to 
Seattle between 2013 and 2018 (Le, 2018). This gigantic increase in population 
consequently created a relative reduction in the housing supply with rents rising by 69% 
between 2010 and 2018 (Rosenberg, 2018). The luxury apartments being developed in 
Amazonia typically come with rents that are on average 40% higher than non-luxury 
housing (Rosenberg, 2016b), creating unaffordable neighborhoods to the middle-income 
workers that form the backbone of the city, like custodians, teachers, firemen, police, 
nurses, etc. Many of these residents have thus been pushed out to the suburbs, 
consequently increasing strain on transportation and contributing to further gentrification 
in peripheral areas of the city (Le, 2018). By 2016, over 107,000 households in the city 
were rent-burdened, that is, they paid 30% or more of their income to rent, and 46,000 
households paid more than half their income to rent (US Official News, 2016b). 
Increasing rents have also contributed to rising levels of homelessness, with one study 
finding that every 5% increase in rent added nearly 260 people to the homeless 
population (Belko, 2017).   
In attempts to control the growing affordability crisis and curb homelessness, 
Seattle has implemented several growth strategies in the last twenty years, not only to 
increase the housing supply and reduce rents (by reducing demand), but also to create 
affordable housing at a time when it has been desperately needed. Housing is considered 
affordable if the rent is less than 30% of the household’s income and rent-restricted units 
are targeted for households who make 30%, 60%, and 80% of the Area Median Income 
(AMI) (City of Seattle Housing Affordability and Livability, 2020a). Due to decreases in 
city and state funding since the 1930s (Association of Washington Cities, 2018; Brenner 
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& Theodore, 2002; Harvey, 1989; Seattle Department of Planning and Development, 
2007), affordable housing strategies have necessarily relied on public-private partnerships 
between the City and developers for funding in the neoliberal epoch. Today, these 
strategies have been markedly characteristic of the roll-with-it phase insofar as they are 
mobilized by privatized market forces: the purported, all-encompassing solution (rather 
than, e.g., reverting back to social-welfarist policies) to public problems that have only 
been deepened by a spiraling gentrification spearheaded by SLUs neoliberalized growth 
machine. 
Near the end of 2010 the Seattle Department of Planning & Development released 
their South Lake Union Urban Design Framework (UDF) to establish goals for the future 
of the neighborhood. Among various neighborhood growth strategies, from how transit 
and transportation issues would be resolved to how the historical character of the 
neighborhood could be preserved, it also created an early framework for addressing 
housing affordability by offering developers an ‘incentivized zoning’ option. With 
incentivized zoning, the City bargained changes to zoning restrictions in exchange for 
either a certain portion of housing units to be reserved for affordable housing (referred to 
as the performance option), or a pay-in-lieu fee per square foot of additional space 
beyond the original restriction (Seattle Department of Planning and Development, 2010). 
The fees accrued from the pay-in-lieu option would then be used by nonprofit developers 
to build affordable housing elsewhere. Additionally, in accordance with the 
Comprehensive Plan of the City (Seattle City Council, 1994), buildings seeking 
additional height also had to obtain Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design 
(LEED) certification (Seattle Department of Planning and Development, 2010). 
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On the surface, these incentivized programs seem like pragmatic solutions to 
shortages of affordable housing. However, the fees are typically low enough that 
developers often opt to pay them rather than take the performance option, from which the 
effects are three-fold: first, the developers are able to maximize rents by not having to 
build affordable housing units in their developments. Second, the fees accrued do not 
contribute to a substantial number of new housing elsewhere due to the overhead costs of 
new developments (i.e., infrastructural costs, building foundations, etc.). The third effect 
these incentivized programs have is to relocate local residents that cannot keep up with 
increasing rents, resulting in the displacement of many people that worked in lower-
paying careers within these neighborhoods.   
Mobilizing Land through Value Capture Strategies 
Shortly following the release of the UDF and incentivized zoning plans another 
growth strategy was unveiled by the City. Conservation-oriented, it involved a 
complicated approach that falls in line with the greater region’s growth strategy 
established in the 1990 Growth Management Act that restricts urban growth to discrete 
boundaries as a way to conserve rural lands (Municipal Research and Services Center, 
2020). From a planning perspective, geographic extension is contained by intensification. 
In other words, by increasing density to accommodate a growing population (which is 
deemed more environmentally sustainable), growth boundaries can be maintained and 
rural areas (forested and farmed) may be preserved. The Landscape Conservation and 
Local Infrastructure Program (LCLIP), signed into law in 2011, was designed as a form 
of tax-increment-financing (TIF) that served this purpose through a three-pronged 
approach: first, it protects rural agricultural and forested lands from future development 
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through the commodification of private property rights. Second, it provides developers 
with an additional avenue to increase their building capacities beyond zoning restrictions. 
Lastly, it provides the City with the opportunity to capture funding (issued as bonds from 
banks) for much needed infrastructure improvements throughout SLU and the Denny 
Triangle (Bonlender, Drewel and Duvernoy, 2013; M2PW, 2013).  
LCLIP was part of a broader program signed into law in 2009 called Transfer of 
Development Rights (TDR), which allowed rural landowners in King County to sell 
development rights to their land which developers could purchase to build beyond 
localized zoning restrictions (Bonlender, Drewel and Duvernoy, 2013; King County TDR 
Program, 2019b). In essence, TDR works by allowing rural landowners the option of 
separating the right to develop on their land from the package of other property rights that 
are afforded to private property owners. Landowners that sell their rights receive a 
conservation easement in return, which protects the land from future development while 
lowering the landowner’s property taxes (King County TDR Program, 2019a). The 
development rights are then converted to credits, which developers may purchase as 
‘conversion commodities.’ The conversion commodities include increases in height, the 
floor area ratio (FAR), the commercial floor area (CFA), parking requirements, among 
others (Bonlender, Drewel and Duvernoy, 2013).  
LCLIP was created in 2011 as a TIF for participating cities in King County (in 
conjunction with neighboring Pierce and Snohomish Counties) to utilize the TDR 
program while also investing in infrastructure projects, including traffic improvements, 
bicycling and pedestrian improvements, and a community center (Seattle Department of 
Planning and Development, 2013). In short, cities were offered the incentive to receive 
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funding for infrastructure through the LCLIP TIF so long as they used a certain 
proportion of county-allotted TDR credits. Once the necessary proportion of TDR credit 
purchases were met, the City could then borrow against future tax revenues to be used 
toward its chosen infrastructure projects. Seattle designated South Lake Union as the 
receiving neighborhood for TDR options due to its rapid development and growth plan at 
first, opting to expand the receiving area into downtown later (Bonlender, Drewel and 
Duvernoy, 2013; Seattle Department of Planning and Development, 2013). 
By 2013, the TIF was fully implemented in SLU and downtown and King County 
agreed to exchange 800 TDR credits (as conversion commodities worth $16 million) for 
up to 75% of the incremental tax increase over 25 years, contingent upon the City’s 
ability to coax developers to buy them (King County TDR Program, 2016; M2PW, 2013; 
Puget Sound Regional Council, 2013). To accomplish this goal the City required that 
developers who wanted to surpass zoning restrictions had to devote a certain proportion 
of the total amount they paid for upzones to both TDR and affordable housing. The 
amounts vary based on whether the development is commercial or residential, with the 
former required to pay 25% into TDR and the rest to affordable housing, and the latter 
required to pay 40% to TDR, 60% to affordable housing. The amounts of additional 
square footage also vary based on whether or not the development is residential as well as 
the type of rural credit (agricultural land or forested land) (King County TDR Program, 
2016), but height restrictions allotted for maximum heights to be increased from 85 feet 
to 240 feet (US Official News, 2017a). The tax increment was estimated to capture $27.7 
million by the end of the 25-year period for the aforementioned infrastructure projects, as 
well as preserve 25,000 acres of regional farmlands (Targeted News Service, 2012). In 
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addition to this, payments to affordable housing were projected to be $45 million by 2031 
(State News Service, Nov 30, 2012) through the pay-in-lieu price of $21.68 per square-
foot for residential space and $29.71 per square-foot for commercial (US State News, Apr 
22 2013).  
Used in this way, tax-increment financing allowed developers throughout Seattle 
to maximize their profits by bypassing the zoning regulations and developing a greater 
number of rentable units within their new developments, at relatively little cost to them 
compared to the cost of steadily increasing rents for a city-wide class of renters. While 
residential developers were given a 25% TDR limit, this equally meant that the amounts 
put toward affordable housing were reduced by the same proportion. In this sense, not 
only did developers contribute more to unaffordability through the TIF program, but the 
City also profited from the developments through the increased tax revenue (of which is 
further ploughed back into more infrastructural investment as well as paying back the TIF 
bonds). This can further be interpreted as the prioritization by the City of environmental 
conservation over the social welfare of its own residents, as the TIF policy actively 
contributed to a decrease of affordability while advancing a pro-environment agenda that 
also happened to be consistent with the rent-seeking interests of SLUs growth machine. 
In these ways, rolling-with LCLIP – discursively choreographed and justified as 
progressive environmental policy – effectively charted new terrain for capital 
accumulation for the private real estate community and, in the process, restructured the 
landscape of rent across Seattle in general and SLU in particular. Thus, is Seattle more 
sustainable? Indeed, but only for white and wealthy residents, exacerbating the very 
housing affordability crisis these programs were ostensibly meant to curtail. 
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The Grand Bargain 
Ed Murray was elected as the new Seattle mayor in 2013 (Baker, 2013), bringing 
a new approach to the affordability crisis with him. A year later, it was obvious that the 
incentivized zoning and TIF wasn’t doing enough to tackle the problem of rising rents for 
middle-income workers in SLU. By this time only 56 rent-restricted units in total had 
been produced through the incentivized zoning program over the previous decade 
(Beekman, 2014). A strong majority of developers were instead choosing to pay the opt-
out fees to surpass zoning restrictions (ibid., 2014), thus ensuring maximum profits for 
themselves by reserving their units for tenants willing to pay higher rents. In September 
2014 Mayor Murray created the Housing Affordability and Livability Advisory 
Committee, a team comprised of both renters and developers to draft recommendations 
on how to properly address the housing affordability crisis by July of 2015 (City of 
Seattle Housing Affordability and Livability, 2020b; Beekman, 2015a).  
As promised, the mayor presented the Council with a total of 65 
recommendations supplied by the Advisory Committee, including a doubling of the 
Seattle Housing Levy, a Mandatory Housing Affordability (MHA) amendment, and tax 
breaks for landlords who host rent-restricted tenants, among others (Beekman, 2015b). In 
the proposal the mayor recommended enacting a mandatory affordable housing fee for all 
new residential developments, with a linkage fee instead for commercial developers to 
upzone if they wish. The mandatory fee, however, would be in lieu of incorporating 
affordable housing as a percentage of the total units, and did not include the additional 
costs of upzoning through TDR (ibid., 2015b).  
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Touted by the mayor as his ‘Grand Bargain,’ the proposal loosened other building 
regulations in order to negotiate with developers and avoid threatening lawsuits while 
incentivizing growth and including contributions to affordable housing (Beekman, 2015b, 
2015c, 2015d).  The mayor spent the next few months working closely with 
Councilmember Mike O’Brien to push for an ordinance that would further lower the 
mandatory fees from commercial developments to between eight and sixteen dollars per 
square foot, in hopes that lower fees would more easily be absorbed in construction and 
encourage further development (Beekman, 2015c). This roll-with-it policy solely served 
the interests of the growth machine to the detriment of the supply of affordable units. By 
deregulating an already neoliberal policy, it was designed to increase the profitability of 
high-rise rents for developers while ultimately increasing the tax revenue for the City 
without producing the necessary amount of affordable homes needed to actually curb the 
rising interrelated affordability and homelessness problems.  
By November 2015 the Council voted to approve the mayor’s ‘Grand Bargain’ to 
require mandatory affordable housing payments on residential developments throughout 
SLU and downtown (Beekman, 2015d). In the spring of the following year, the mayor, in 
collaboration with the Council, began to mold this affordable housing program into what 
would become Mandatory Housing Affordability (MHA) in which the same mandatory 
contributions would be extended to commercial developments (Beekman, 2016). While 
the plan was projected to produce 20,000 affordable units by 2026, the city anticipated 
that half of units produced by the MHA would be the result of the opt-out fees (Beekman, 
2016); that is, it was expected that due to the high costs of high-rise construction, the 
developers found it more profitable to pay the fees and keep their units at market-rates 
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than restrict rents in a portion of them. As mentioned, this further exacerbates 
affordability citywide as lower-income residents are pushed out of the neighborhoods 
where they work, effectively streamlining the displacement process that gentrification 
embodies.   
While the mayor and council worked out the details of MHA throughout the latter 
half of the year, the Office for Housing (OH) passed a new $290 million Housing Levy 
for affordable housing development (US Official News, 2016a; City of Seattle Office of 
Housing, 2020). With a 70% vote, Seattle homeowners added $10.17 per month to their 
property taxes (City of Seattle Office of Housing, 2016) with the hope of producing 7,500 
new affordable homes to the city (US Official News, 2016b). Prior to the new Levy, the 
OH used Levy funds on nearly 4,500 affordable units between 2015 and 2016 (US 
Official News, 2016b). While the OH, Department of Planning and Development, City 
Council and mayor’s office are all separate entities, the wholly different approach taken 
by the OH and accepted by the residents of Seattle suggests an implicit solidarity between 
the classes of homeowners and renters in the struggle to create a more affordable Seattle. 
The apparent welfarist nature of the Housing Levy stands in sharp contrast to the 
apologetic approach to the affordability crisis that the Council and mayor’s office have 
taken through persistent neoliberalized policies of real estate deregulation and 
marketization.  
Mandatory Housing Affordability 
In the spring of 2017, the Council voted 9-0 for the MHA upzones of South Lake 
Union and Downtown to be applied to residential developments and granted developers 
extra heights and floor space above and beyond what was previously allowed (Beekman, 
71 
 
2017a). The Council also agreed to allow additional heights to developers who included 
10 three-bedroom rent-restricted units (US Official News, 2017b). Councilmember Lisa 
Herbold tried to push for higher requirements from developers, but the amendment failed 
(Beekman, 2017a), likely due to the threat of legal action by developers. Vocal members 
of the community came forward and protested the passing of MHA, asserting that 
developers believed that lower income residents would depreciate the market values of 
the rest of the building units, which would thus contribute to further displacement of local 
residents to neighborhoods far from their jobs. They argued, correctly, that the new 
MHA-funded affordable housing developments would end up in places where land is 
cheaper, far from downtown where many community members work (Beekman, 2017b).  
Councilmember Rob Johnson, a key proponent of MHA, refuted claims of 
landlord elitism and instead assured the public that development of affordable housing 
was still a good thing, whether nearby or not (Beekman, 2017b). He praised the passing 
of the bill and claimed that seven developers had already opted in which would contribute 
an extra $25 million into affordable housing (US Official News, 2017c). However, 
investigative reports proved later that Johnson had lied – that no one had opted in, and 
that the $25 million was not only a ballpark estimate but was also not attributable to the 
new MHA at all (US Official News, 2017d). It should be stressed that MHA stands in 
stark contrast to the principles of smart growth and sustainability (concepts heavily 
promoted by the City’s LCLIP and TDR programs) which promote socio-economic 
diversity within neighborhoods, rather than the deepening segregation that such 
affordable housing programs have produced. 
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In the fall of 2017, the mayor resigned amidst a scandal and the mayoral seat was 
replaced by Jenny Durkan, a progressive move for the City as she was the first female 
mayor in Seattle in nearly a hundred years (Canadian Press, 2017; Beekman, 2017c). 
However, her campaign was funded by a super-PAC spearheaded by Amazon, marking 
not only an early step forward for Amazon into local politics, but her as a favorable ally 
to corporate interests as well (Harlow & Stelter, 2019). As the elections came to an end 
the Council pushed forward a new proposal to extend MHA to all urban villages, 
commercial and multi-family zones throughout the city (US Official News, 2017e), 
despite neighborhood coalitions speaking out against gentrification, traffic congestion, 
and developer handouts (Beekman, 2017d; Le, 2018). 
Councilmember Johnson offered an apologist’s response to these concerns, 
saying, “If we make no changes to zoning, those buildings will be built, and they will be 
built without affordable housing components to them” (Le, 2018 p. 1). In other words, the 
City adopted a ‘TINA’ policy toward the rapid redevelopment of the city, disregarding 
public concerns that City efforts to increase affordability were too narrow-sighted and 
favored the landlords, not the tenants. Many groups believed that MHA was a backroom 
deal between for-profit and nonprofit developers, culminating in a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ 
deal (Beekman, 2019a).  
The City court ruled in late 2018 that the Environmental Impact Statement was 
adequate for a citywide MHA, although the Hearing Examiner explicitly stated that the 
“ruling was limited to the letter of the law. . . .state Environmental Policy Act didn’t 
obligate the city to analyze economic displacement of residents that could result from the 
upzones” (Beekman, 2018, p. 1), further highlighting the disconnect, routinely exploited 
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by capital, between social and environmental justice issues (which are in reality 
inseparable). Mayor Durkan celebrated the ruling publicly, reiterating the City’s need for 
more affordable housing (US Official News, 2018) as if the MHA was the only way it 
could be developed. The citywide ordinance for MHA passed early in 2019 with a 9-0 
vote in the city council (Targeted News Service, 2019a). The new, citywide MHA is 
expected to generate a total of 3,000 new affordable homes by 2029, a far cry from the 
45,000 severely rent-burdened households currently residing in the city (Targeted News 
Service, 2019b).  
However victorious the city felt over this measure, the problem of affordable 
housing the City faces still exists because the money for-profit developers are paying into 
MHA is not enough to curb the demand for more affordable housing. In fact, in June of 
2019 Bellwether Housing, a prominent nonprofit developer, held a fundraising event for 
future affordable housing developments within the Amazon Spheres as an attempt to 
crowdfund from tech employees (Buhayar, 2019). The inability for MHA to fully fund 
the need for affordable housing could not be more obvious when considering the need for 
nonprofits to seek donations from the employees whose very jobs are a key contributor to 
the problem!  
The Corporate Head Tax 
MHA and other forms of incentivized zoning were not the only ways the City has 
looked to ameliorate a shortage in affordable housing. Early in 2018 the City began 
considering a ‘Head Tax’ on large employers that could be allocated directly to 
affordable housing. The tax would only apply to employers that had annual gross receipts 
of $20 million, which targeted companies like Amazon, Vulcan, Starbucks, Expedia, 
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among others (Wingfield, 2018). The proposed tax was to charge the City’s largest 
employers $500 a year per employee, which was expected to raise $75 million for 
affordable housing and homeless services (Wingfield, 2018; Scruggs, 2018). Throughout 
the early months of consideration Amazon quietly lobbied the Council against the tax 
(Wingfield, 2018), and when that strategy appeared that it would fail Amazon 
preemptively retaliated by halting construction on one of its towers, holding 7,000 jobs as 
hostage as it awaited the Council’s decision. Councilmember O’Brien was quoted saying, 
“They’re not really asking for anything… they’re just telling us what they’re going to do” 
(ibid., 2018, p. 2). In response to Amazon’s antagonistic gesture, the Council passed the 
tax at a considerably reduced rate of $275 per employee, which was projected to raise 
only $47 million for affordable housing and homeless services (Scruggs, 2018). Drew 
Hardener, Amazon’s vice president, said of the tax bill: “We remain very apprehensive 
about the future created by the Council’s hostile approach and rhetoric toward larger 
businesses, which forces us to question our growth here” (ibid., 2018, para. 4). It was 
during this same time that Amazon was considering other cities’ bids for a second 
headquarters. By leveraging jobs as a measured approach to combat Seattle’s Head Tax, 
coupled with the careful language it directed to the Council, it was sending a message to 
all cities that “a stable and business-friendly environment and tax structure” (Hobbes, 
2018, p. 3) would be highest priority considerations. This was despite evidence that their 
intentions were already set on the DC area and they only used country-wide bidding wars 
between cities to exploit New York for favorable incentivized packages (Kully, 2018).  
Almost immediately after the passing of the Head Tax, Amazon, along with 
Vulcan, Starbucks, and other large regional employers gave over $350,000 to the No Tax 
75 
 
On Jobs coalition to repeal the head tax (Canadian Press, 2018). In June, fearful that 
Amazon would abandon Seattle outright, eight of the nine councilmembers met in a 
closed-door meeting and agreed to repeal the Head Tax all together (Kully, 2018). 
According to Kshama Sawant, the one councilmember that was absent, who also serves 
as the only socialist on the Council, the blatant, behind-the-scenes collusion of City 
councilmembers was not only an “absolutely despicable” violation of the Open Public 
Meetings Act, but was “also… business as usual” (ibid., 2018, p. 2). Sawant has been at 
the forefront of the fight for tenant’s rights, more affordable housing, rent control, and 
other social justice issues since her election onto the council in 2013, and has been an 
active voice against “Amazon’s incredible power to dictate events and suffer no 
consequences” (Sammon, 2019, p. 2).  
Usurping Democracy 
In 2019 Amazon flexed their political muscle again, this time pushing their tax 
and business-friendly agenda into the City Council elections. After gaining a political ally 
in Mayor Durkan with the mayoral election in 2017, Amazon now aimed their sights at 
the entire Council. Seven of the nine seats were up for grabs, including Sawant’s seat. A 
month before the election Amazon pledged an unprecedented $1.45 million to the Civic 
Alliance for a Sound Economy (CASE), a super-PAC run by the Seattle Chamber of 
Commerce (Sammon, 2019). CASE, also backed by other powerful corporations 
including Starbucks, Expedia, Alaska Airlines, and Vulcan (Baker, 2019; Johnson, 2019), 
and with a total funding pool of $4 million (Eichen, 2019), launched a campaign to 
replace all seven seats with business-friendly candidates who would show favor to the 
large corporations headquartered in the city.  
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In short, CASE amounted to nothing less than a massive class-monopoly among 
some of the most powerful global corporations pulling their collective influence over the 
local political landscape in Seattle. In this context, class-monopoly regimes are to be 
interpreted as antithetical to democratic politics insofar as the collective interests of 
privileged private interests run roughshod over the majority of Seattle’s citizenry. CASE 
represents a collective pool of investment dollars delivered from these global corporate 
interests to influence public policy in their favor. As such, the potential return on this 
investment is interpreted as a broader scale form of AR (beyond the boundaries of SLU) 
to the extent that this return is realized not only by CASE contributors, but rent-seekers 
operating across the city in general. 
Common rhetoric used by CASE’s campaign echoed their fight to retake the 
government, using slogans like “Seattle has a right to a functioning government. . . .now 
is the time to demand one” (Beekman, 2019c, para. 8), along with a contrived urgency for 
a “government that works” (Knowles, 2019, para. 23). Owing to her outspoken support of 
the corporate head tax and frequent criticism of big corporations as policy drivers, 
Sawant had the biggest target on her head, followed by Lisa Herbold, who not only 
tended to vote progressive, but had just recently traveled to New York to meet with 
Senators and union leaders to discuss some of the unintended consequences of hosting 
Amazon’s headquarters in the city (Sammon, 2019; Baker, 2019).  
Amazon’s enormous political contribution brought a lot of out-of-state attention 
to the elections, especially by presidential candidates Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth 
Warren, who both spoke out openly on Twitter against Amazon’s attempt to buy the 
election (Baker, 2019; Golden, 2019b; Scruggs, 2019). Candidates for Council seats also 
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spoke out against Amazon’s donations, with Sawant claiming “big corporations like 
Amazon are… going to war against ordinary people in this city… and are attempting to 
buy this election,” (Golden, 2019a, para. 15), and candidate Tammy Morales calling it “a 
cynical attempt to buy our democracy” (Nickelsburg, 2019b, para. 28). Big corporations 
weren’t the only ones contributing large amounts to the election, however. Tech workers 
throughout Seattle poured in political donations, with Microsoft employees donating four 
times the amount they donated to the 2015 Council elections and Amazon employees 
donating eight times more than the last round (Nickelsburg, 2019b). Unions and other 
progressive donors also formed their own PAC to combat CASE, called the Civic 
Alliance for a Progressive Economy (CAPE) (Beekman, 2019b). In general, PAC 
spending accounted for well over half of all spending on the election, estimated at around 
$7.3 million (Beekman, 2019d).  
One unintended side-effect of the large swaths of political donations was the 
unravelling of a 2015 political donation program known as Democracy Vouchers, where 
each voter within Seattle was given four $25 vouchers to donate to the political 
campaigns of their choosing (Baker, 2019; Eichen, 2019). Originally intended to balance 
out the influence of large donors and better represent the electorate, the program set 
limits to political spending for candidates who participated in the program as a way to 
level the playing field. Nearly all of the candidates, however, opted out of the program 
due to the danger of being drowned out by super-PAC spending (Baker, 2019). For 
instance, CASE shelled out more than $443,000 to Sawant’s political rival, giving him a 
huge advantage over what would have been a pittance in comparison had she participated 
in the voucher program (Nickelsburg, 2019b).  
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Throughout the month-long race Seattleites were bombarded by advertisements 
by various PACs and grassroots campaigns through every form possible – TV, social 
media, and mail ads, along with thousands of canvassers knocking door-to-door; 
“[they’re] swamping the democratic process,” a resident in West Seattle complained 
(Beekman, 2019b, para. 5). Sawant’s campaign alone canvassed 200,000 doors in the city 
and successfully raised $500,000 for her campaign (Gilbert, 2019; Knowles, 2019). Small 
donor contributions also quadrupled from 2015’s Council elections, speaking to the 
ability of grassroots movements to defy corporate activism (Eichen, 2019). 
Ultimately, Amazon’s contribution had a negative effect on voter attitudes both 
throughout the city and the country. Out-of-state contributions ballooned in support of 
Sawant and other candidates not funded by CASE (Eichen, 2019). The effect was so 
polarizing, in fact, that the individual politics of many council candidates became 
shrouded by a larger fight manifested between those opposed to Amazon’s political 
power and those who were funded by CASE, or as one reporter called it, “Amazon versus 
socialism” (Westneat, 2019, p. 1). “The Amazon money was a big distraction,” Sawant’s 
opponent admitted (Golden, 2019b, para. 7), while several other candidates backed by 
CASE attempted to distance themselves from the super-PAC. Candidate Pederson even 
refused to receive donations from PACs or developers in an attempt to detach his 
campaign from that of corporate interest, although CASE counterintuitively endorsed him 
anyway (Nickelsburg, 2019b).  
In the end, Amazon’s attempt to usurp the democratic process in Seattle failed. At 
the end of an election over what Sawant called “the very soul of Seattle” (Baker, 2019, 
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para. 5), only two candidates backed by corporate donations won seats on the city council 
(Scruggs, 2019). Sawant won a narrow victory of 3.6%, attributing her win to  
“the power of socialist ideas, Marxist ideas, the power of our analysis, strategies, 
our understanding of class struggle, the historical memory and lessons we bring 
of the past victories and defeats of our class, the working class” (Kroman, 2019 
para. 4).  
“If anything,” she said, “we underestimated the brazenness of Bezos, corporate real 
estate, and big business” (Kampmark, 2019 p. 2).   
The election served, to be sure, as a warning to the City of the dangers of super-
PAC spending and corporate influence in the democratic process. To avoid future issues 
in Council election campaigns, the City immediately followed the election by pushing 
two legislative bills to limit corporate and super-PAC influence. In January 2020, the 
Council approved the Clean Campaigns Act that bans political contributions by 
companies that have at least 5% foreign ownership (Scruggs, 2020). This was primarily 
directed at Amazon, who had 9% foreign ownership as of the beginning of 2020 (ibid., 
2020). Further legislation introduced by Councilmember González that would cap 
contributions from PACs to $5,000 (Beekman, 2019d, 2020) has yet to be approved.   
Discussion 
What Seattle has shown through the last twenty years exemplifies all three phases 
of neoliberalization. From the roll-back, or destruction, of the vision for SLU that was 
developed by community residents in 1998 to the roll-out, or creation, of Vulcan’s 
neighborhood-wide megaproject, to the roll-with-it phase of the City’s attempts to curb 
housing inequality while prioritizing growth (the very growth that generates this 
inequality to being with), the City has by and large adopted the neoliberal mantra that 
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‘there is no alternative’. This section of the chapter will look at some of the main public-
private partnerships outlined throughout this narrative with special attention to how 
specific events followed the logics of neoliberalization and engendered class-monopoly 
rent regimes. It will then turn to a closer look at the events that unfolded between 
Amazon and the City, and SLU as a site of struggle in the face of corporate discipline 
before engaging more specifically with the culture of CMR, as implicated in the 
rationalized logics exhibited in media portrayals of new development.  
Roll Out 
In the earliest phases of redeveloping SLU, Vulcan pressured the City to not only 
sell land cheaply to Vulcan, but to fund infrastructure as well. As Weber (2002) points 
out, this is common neoliberal practice for value capture because cities do not have the 
same profit motives as private developers. However, the role the City plays in its own 
pursuit of future tax revenues (i.e., the primary source of funding as cities no longer rely 
on federal funding) is guided by neoliberal logic in that city governments necessarily 
adopt entrepreneurial spirits as they’re disciplined to work with the private sector 
(Harvey, 1989). Cities are encouraged through the disciplining logics of neoliberal 
governmentality to support developers especially with investments in infrastructure, 
without which developers would deem projects to be less profitable than what is deemed 
socially acceptable, thereby stymieing growth.  
The ‘Mercer Mess’ bill in 2003 was a perfect example of this, where the City 
footed a $500 million investment to improve the corridor connecting Vulcan’s campus to 
the rest of the city. Undoubtedly Vulcan could have afforded this bill. Their profits would 
have invariably come at a much later date, however, and time is of the essence in a 
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capitalist economy. Cities are also now disciplined to be constantly wary of the 
competitive edge of other cities, and to outcompete them whenever possible (Peck & 
Tickell, 2002). In light of this, Vulcan, in close collaboration with the mayor, urged the 
City that they would lose the opportunity as a hub for biotech if they did not act 
accordingly. Thus, the City succumbed to both TINA discourse and the will of capital.  
Roll-With-It 
The implementation of LCLIP serves as another example of roll-with-it 
neoliberalization, and also as a unique situation where land was mobilized as a financial 
asset by the state to benefit real estate developers. The County, in conjunction with the 
City, served to enhance developers’ collective profits (and thus ARD) through 
deregulation of zoning requirements in exchange for preserving rural space. Rather than 
restrict rural development outright, the County relied instead on the private real estate 
market to generate the tax revenue the County would have collected had they allowed 
development in rural spaces (therefore preserving not only the environment, but ARS as 
well). While I am not hereby critiquing their choice to preserve agricultural and forested 
land, it nonetheless exemplifies the continual reliance on the private market to solve 
public problems generated in the previous roll-out phase by the same private market, and 
further limit housing supply in the process which only serves to exacerbate the housing 
affordability and homelessness crises.  
Moreover, by utilizing the tax-increment financing from LCLIP in SLU, the City 
helped developers close the rent gap (DR2D) by increasing the land value around the 
Mercer corridor by borrowing from future tax revenues to invest in redeveloping the 
infrastructure around Vulcan’s property. The huge investment in redeveloping the 
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corridor was shown in reports that it would not actually change congestion through the 
area. Rather, the creation of the seven-lane, two-way boulevard complete with pedestrian 
paths and trees brought aesthetic appeal to its surroundings, allowing Vulcan and other 
developers to increase the ARD they command by transforming space into a bourgeois 
playground vis-à-vis increasing pedestrian accessibility and visual appeal to the 
immediate area. AR is implicated here in that the bottom-line for SLU rent-seekers 
(including Vulcan) are collectively serviced via TIF, as well as the local state’s revenue 
streams which are (ARS), in the neoliberal epoch, inextricably tied to the success of such 
redevelopment projects. The financial institutions that lend to the state are also serviced 
as it is out of the increased tax revenues that the state pays back the bonds with interest. 
LCLIP as a form of roll-with-it neoliberalization therefore produces a circumstance of 
rent appropriation, following (2) and (3), that can be seen as: 
𝑅𝐿𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑃 = 𝐷𝑅2𝐷 + 𝐷𝑅2𝐹 + 𝐴𝑅𝐷 + 𝐴𝑅𝑆 + 𝐴𝑅𝐹    (5) 
at the very least, or 
𝑅𝐿𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑃 = 𝐷𝑅2𝐷 + 𝐷𝑅2𝐹 + 𝐶𝑀𝑅𝐿𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑃    (6) 
MHA serves as another example of an unapologetic neoliberal policy designed to 
merely nod at the increasing inequalities in the housing market rather than spring into 
action a social-welfarist alternative. As Peck and Tickell (2002, p. 394, original 
emphasis) point out, concerns for the middle- and low-income population “can only be 
addressed after growth, jobs, and investment have been secured, and even then in no 
more than a truncated and productivist fashion.” This ‘growth-first’ logic manifests 
through the MHA program in two ways: first, by allowing developers to opt-out of 
inclusionary housing, which allows developers to maximize the rents (e.g., ARD) they 
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receive in luxury housing developments by excluding affordable units, and second, 
through charging developers such a small amount that the amount of affordable housing 
projected to be built is but a tiny fraction of the amount needed for severely rent-
burdened households. As mentioned, the MHA expects to produce 3,000 new affordable 
units by 2029, which is about 6.6% of the current need right now. In other words, the 
MHA is a feel-good measure, meant to squelch public outcry through the illusion of care. 
In terms of the opt-out fee itself, the amounts per square foot within the SLU area are 
significantly lower than anywhere else in the city. This is obviously to encourage growth 
within SLU, as the City wants to hit the targeted tax revenues (ARS) they outlined when 
developing the TIF. Even if the fees were higher, it follows that development would 
likely continue unabated considering the reality that it has yet to slow even with abundant 
vacancies. MHA, then, as a roll-with-it form of neoliberalization, produces a 
circumstance of rent appropriation similar to that of LCLIP: 
𝑅𝑀𝐻𝐴 = 𝐷𝑅2𝐷 + 𝐷𝑅2𝐹 + 𝐴𝑅𝐷 + 𝐴𝑅𝑆    (7) 
or 
𝑅𝑀𝐻𝐴 = 𝐷𝑅2𝐷 + 𝐷𝑅2𝐹 + 𝐶𝑀𝑅𝑀𝐻𝐴     (8) 
Further Manifestations of Rent in SLU 
Many other forms of rent are implicated in the media’s portrayal of SLU and 
Belltown, from the monopoly-cultivating discourse of nonsubstitutability to the 
differential attributes that spatiality affords. Dominant in SLU and Belltown are the 
discursive tactics (articulated through the media) that not only ‘brand’ the district as a 
whole, but particular developments as well as ‘unique.’ As one developer CEO, Mr. 
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Shah, said in an interview, “South Lake Union has become the most desirable 
neighborhood in Seattle” (Business Wire, 2017, p. 2). A feature in The New York Times 
called it a “city within a city” (Hodges, 2009, p. 2). Likewise, Belltown has been 
discursively choreographed as “one of the best sites in Seattle” by another developer 
CEO (PR Newswire, 2014, p. 2), even being compared to the Village in New York City 
(He, 2016). These perceptions, although subjectively communicated by individual 
speakers, serve to reify images in the minds of readers that SLU and Belltown have 
distinct, nonsubstitutable characteristics that set them apart from all other neighborhoods.  
Comparing places with, for example, New York’s Village, implies that nowhere 
else in Seattle is similar enough to warrant such a comparison. This is interpreted as a 
marketing tactic that weakens one place’s (real or imagined) sense of uniqueness while 
empowering another’s. The situated meaning in comparing the two, I suggest, influences 
the reader to perceive the Village as suddenly less unique at the national scale, and 
Belltown more unique within Seattle, and in this way strengthens perceptions of Belltown 
as a nonsubstitutable neighborhood in the Seattle housing market. Similarly, naming SLU 
as the ‘most desirable neighborhood’ is a marketing tactic that is meant to strengthen the 
perception among readers that SLU is indeed the most desirable, and thus exclusive, 
whether it is in material reality or not.  
To be sure, from a developer’s standpoint in 2017, SLU was seen as a highly 
profitable submarket for development. To the renting and working classes, however, SLU 
has been increasingly unaffordable. Concurrently, it has “continue[d] to attract [the] 
creative class” (US State News, 2009, p. 2), suggesting that prospective buyers are 
indeed, to some extent, ‘drinking the Kool-Aid’, or in other words, succumbing to the 
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discursive illusion curated through this mode of place branding. However, to the extent 
that the marketing of place as unique and nonsubstitutable works, the distinction between 
material and discursive reality begins to evaporate, as subjective perception falsely blends 
into perceived objectivity insofar as prospective buyers’ decision-making processes are 
impacted by this discursive campaign accordingly.  
At the individual scale of developments, monopoly rents have been especially 
enhanced through the marketing of Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design 
(LEED) buildings. Early in SLU’s development, these labels on buildings could be seen 
as monopolistic features insofar as no other buildings within their proximity were also 
developed with these kinds of features. Similarly, buildings advertised as having 
“stunning” (Marketwire, 2016, p. 2) and “breathtaking” (Newswire, 2018, p. 2) views of 
downtown and Puget Sound serve to produce feelings that these features can be found 
nowhere else, despite these features being near-ubiquitous. Other language like 
“unparalleled proximity” (PR Newswire, 2015, p. 2) or “in the shadow of the iconic 
Space Needle” (Marketwire, 2012, p. 2), can be directly associated with the locational 
advantages or disadvantages attributable to differential rent, as well as a fabricated 
illusion of monopolistic quality. Labels of residential developments being ‘amenity-rich’ 
also prosper.  
All of these labels and features are attributable to forms of MR and DR; MR 
through discursive illusion and DR by unbridled reality, suggesting that at the 
neighborhood scale, forms of MR and DR are inseparable. If there is genuinely no 
substitute, then MR reigns supreme, though it transforms into DR with each new 
subsequent development that offers legitimate substitutes. Of course, to the extent that 
86 
 
these developments are created by the same property owners/producers, then the 
monopoly situation is retained; and if it’s a cadre of property owners/producers working 
collaboratively rather than competitively, then the proportion of MR is transformed into 
AR: the relationship between property owners, producers, and consumers is ultimately 
what matters most in deciphering the relevant categories of rent in play. 
None of the marketed features of luxury apartments in SLU and Belltown are 
actually nonsubstitutable. This may have been the case early on in the development of 
these neighborhoods, when only one or two buildings with unique features existed, but 
through the homogenization of these features the proportion of MR/DR declines in 
relation to AR. At the metropolitan scale, however, the standardization of amenities (e.g., 
LEED certification and rooftop views) in the individualized submarkets of SLU and 
Belltown become the basis for ‘monopolistic competition’ with other neighborhoods (see 
Smith, 1992; Tretter, 2009; Harvey, 2012), implicating an inseparable unity of AR/DR 
insofar as the benefits from this amenity standardization accrue to SLU and Belltown 
landowners collectively (AR) vis-à-vis rent-seekers operating in other Seattle 
neighborhoods that lack these amenities (DR).  
Discursive strategies for rent appropriation aside, the manifestation of AR (and 
therefore CMR) is a social relation, and as such the social formations around it deserve 
special attention. As M. Anderson (2014, 2019) points out, one of the hallmarks of CMR 
is the active anticompetitive collaboration between different actors of the landowning 
class in order to maximize profits that are extracted through rents. To the extent that rent-
seekers as a class follow the profit-maximizing imperatives afforded to them in a 
capitalist society, collusion between various actors becomes unnecessary for the 
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extraction of CMR (ibid., 2014, 2019). The circumstances of CMR, however, are 
nonetheless exposed in full force in the context of collusive engagement in 
anticompetitive and collaborative behavior. This is perhaps best observed in landlord 
associations, where class consciousness of the power afforded by private property rights 
is laid bare. The Washington Multi Family Housing Association (WMFHA), for instance, 
displays on their homepage, “members are encouraged to use each other for business 
needs, to promote our collective successes. . . and to assist others to grow their business” 
(www.wmfha.org) . Here, members of this particular rental association are emboldened 
to ensure the overall success of the landowning class through cooperation, thus 
engendering oligopolistic (hence, class-monopoly) conditions and increasing their 
collective bottom line. For, in the absence of competition, the baseline for what 
constitutes the minimum socially acceptable rate of return can be raised across the board, 
limited only by effective demand.  
Likewise, the Rental Housing Association of Washington (RHAWA) openly 
counsels members to actively work with local government to ensure the success of the 
landowning class. Both WMFHA and RHAWA run PACs that aggressively attempt to 
steer voters towards both politicians and policies alike that benefit the landowning class 
while subjugating renters. The PAC website run by RHAWA, for instance, displays on 
their website that “the most important protection for our industry involves electing and 
building relationships with politicians who understand the importance and value of the 
rental housing industry” (www.rhawa.org/pac). This can be interpreted in no other way 
than exactly what it says: participants of the landowning class perceive the active 
collaboration with the state as a necessity in order to protect the rights and privileges of 
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rent-seekers above and beyond the laws already in place through the institution private 
property. This is precisely to the same effect that the collaborative behavior 
acknowledged by WMFHA serves to ensure that the bottom line is sustained, and 
necessarily so in conjunction with a compliant local government.  
Moreover, the political activism of PACs backed by various landlord associations 
have successfully reduced MHA fees and performance options within the most profitable 
submarkets in Seattle, as evidenced by the markedly lower MHA requirements within 
SLU and the rest of downtown compared to less profitable submarkets within the City. 
As is commonly seen in negotiations between public and private entities, lawsuits may 
also be used as bargaining tools between developers and cities, as was the case in Mayor 
Murray’s ‘Grand Bargain’ when incentivized zoning first entered the purview of Seattle’s 
redevelopment scene, as well as in Portland (Anderson, Hansen, Arms & Tsikalas, 
forthcoming). Developers in SLU and Belltown (as in Portland) were therefore able to 
enhance, or more accurately, preserve their ARD further by leveraging threat of legal 
action should their minimum acceptable returns be threatened by regulation.  
It is possible that the ‘bargain’ between developers and the City Council over the 
MHA regulations as they stand may have been nothing more than a façade, although 
proving this is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, I make the following 
hypothesis: the MHA regulations and the amount of AR claimed by both developers and 
the City are inversely related. The lower the MHA regulations are, the higher the absolute 
rents claimed by developers in the form of rents and the City in the form of taxes (as well 
as the investors to both). Had the pay-in-lieu fees been higher, developers would likely 
build less, therefore reducing the potential rents they claim in the form of ARD while 
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simultaneously reducing the tax revenues that the City receives (via ARS). Likewise, 
should the performance option of including rent-restricted housing be higher, ARS would 
also be reduced because the ultimate market value of the entire building would be 
reduced. It is implied, therefore, that the settled upon MHA regulations are a win-win 
situation for both developers and the City and produce the highest possible rents in the 
form of ARD, ARS, and ARF. In this way, these MHA regulations represent a necessary 
‘quick-fix’ policy reeking of roll-with-it neoliberalization functioning to serve the 
collective bottom-lines for both developers, the City, and investors, while appeasing, at 
least minimally, a local population increasingly fed-up with increasing housing 
unaffordability.  
We thus have the conditions necessary for generating the variegated 
circumstances that give rise to an expanded rent formula for SLU, which may be applied 
to Belltown as well: 
𝑅𝑆𝐿𝑈 =  𝐷𝑅1𝐿 +  𝐷𝑅1𝐷 +  𝐷𝑅1𝐹 +  𝐷𝑅2𝐷 +  𝐷𝑅2𝐹 + 𝑀𝑅𝐿 + 𝑀𝑅𝐷 + 𝑀𝑅𝐹 + 𝐴𝑅𝐿 +
𝐴𝑅𝐷 + 𝐴𝑅𝐹 + 𝐴𝑅𝑆 + 𝐶𝑀𝑅𝐿𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑃 + 𝐶𝑀𝑅𝑀𝐻𝐴   (9) 
or 
𝑅𝑆𝐿𝑈 = 𝐷𝑅1𝐿 + 𝐷𝑅1𝐷 + 𝐷𝑅1𝐹 + 𝐷𝑅2𝐷 + 𝐷𝑅2𝐹 + 𝑀𝑅𝐿 + 𝑀𝑅𝐷 + 𝑀𝑅𝐹 + 𝐶𝑀𝑅𝑆𝐿𝑈 
 (10) 
where CMRSLU is the aggregate sum of the proportions of rent attributable to AR created 
from class collaboration in Seattle, both in the sense of place branding and in the standard 
scenario of reservation pricing, plus the portion of AR attributable to both LCLIP and 
MHA programs, or 
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𝐶𝑀𝑅𝑆𝐿𝑈 = 𝐶𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺 + 𝐶𝑀𝑅𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑅𝐷 + 𝐶𝑀𝑅𝐿𝐶𝐿𝐼𝑃 + 𝐶𝑀𝑅𝑀𝐻𝐴   
 (11) 
The general collaboration of landlords (individual and incorporated) and 
developers working together, as well as the fact that many of these developers/landlords 
are sitting on vacant rental units without adjusting rents based on supply/demand 
conditions, creates the instances of ARL and ARD outside of those produced by LCLIP 
and MHA. The representation of ARS in (9) exists here in the form of the proportion of 
tax revenues not attributable to those generated by LCLIP or MHA. As mentioned, ARF 
need not be explicitly implicated insofar as many (if not most) of the investments in 
redevelopment necessitate financial backing, to be paid back through future rents in the 
form of interest. Regardless, it is included in the equation to represent its necessary 
existence. 
This is not likely the full picture, however, as Amazon’s role in how class 
monopoly rents are extracted has not yet been addressed. In the following section I will 
discuss this role as it is intrinsically related to the landscape of rent cultivation in SLU 
and the megacorporation’s flagrant wielding of financial power.  
Neoliberal Governmentality and Grassroots Alternatives 
The behavior of Amazon through the last several years shows that although the 
City Council consistently engaged in roll-with-it policies that favored growth and big 
business over the welfare of the people, emergent resistance movements have created 
sites of contestation within localized hierarchical power structures. The corporate head 
tax, for instance, was markedly both anti-neoliberal and neoliberal: anti-neoliberal in that 
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it attempted to create regulations on the local private market for public benefit, and 
neoliberal in that it attempted this without regulating the specific market that was 
affecting the population. In other words, a purely alternative policy reform that would 
have benefitted the population of Seattle would have likely looked at regulating the 
housing market, which is the source of the affordability crisis. Instead, the new policy 
sought to regulate other actors – businesses that more or less do not directly operate 
within the housing market, to solve the problems generated by the housing market.  
This, as I suggested, may have been the result of both the City and developers 
working collectively to increase their individual forms of AR by turning instead to 
regulating alternative sources outside of the real estate industry as a source of funding for 
affordable housing programs. As a result, Amazon, an actor that simultaneously operates 
both at the local and global scales of the capitalist economy, offered a powerful 
ultimatum to the City’s regulatory agenda by holding 7,000 jobs hostage, and in doing so 
revealed itself as a ‘glocalized’ actor operating at the meso-scale of neoliberalization 
processes, the global-local connective tissue that directs neoliberal disciplinary effects 
both downward and upward, e.g., instilling local government capitulation in the context 
of national-scale inter-urban competition (see Ward & Swyngedouw, 2018). 
In response to Amazon the City immediately cowered out of fear of losing 
Amazon and its ability to accumulate capital in the City. Interestingly, this occurred at the 
same time that Amazon was running a bidding-war between cities across the country. By 
leveraging jobs as a show of force, this can be interpreted as a case of neoliberal 
governmentality insofar as councilmembers learned to not cross the corporate giant and 
in turn began to self-discipline themselves to favor and obey corporate interests. The fact 
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that councilmembers did indeed conduct a secretive meeting to cancel the tax suggests 
this to be true. Similarly, Amazon’s hostile behavior served as a warning to cities bidding 
for HQ2 that disruptions to capital accumulation would not go unpunished. To the extent 
that other cities further increased incentive packages for Amazon to prove allegiance to 
the megacorporation and loyalty to its corporate interests, this can also be viewed as a 
case of neoliberal governmentality at the meso-scale of urban governance. After proving 
to its headquarter city that it would not be regulated by local laws, cities around the 
country did indeed respond by offering better incentivized packages in their lust for 
global capital. In doing so they have become more self-disciplined to adapt increasingly 
market-oriented policies that are friendly to Amazon in particular, and capital 
accumulation in general.  
There are additional connotations to Amazon’s refusal to pay into Seattle’s 
affordable housing programs, however. By outright refusing the head tax, which would 
have produced $47 million for affordable housing in Seattle, the City remained that much 
more unaffordable. In other words, the City remained as unaffordable as it was before, 
because their attempts at regulating big corporations through the Head Tax failed. This 
allowed the landowning class to continue claiming AR (and thus CMR) at full speed, 
with no change. This is the role that Amazon has played in the extraction of CMR – had 
they succumbed to regulation and allowed the tax to move forward, the City would have 
been slightly more affordable, albeit to a handful of families. Nevertheless, had there 
been an increase in rent-restricted rental units provided by the tax, the baseline of 
minimum socially acceptable rents would have theoretically been reduced to some 
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extent.8 Amazon has therefore nurtured, at least in part, an opportunistic environment for 
exploitation by private capitalist interests, including rent-seekers operating across the city 
in general and SLU in particular, through the cancellation of more socially progressive 
alternative futures. Amazon, in this context, can be interpreted as representing the 
interests of Seattle’s private business and real-estate sectors on their behalf. 
Despite Seattle’s failure to tax Amazon in 2018, the 2019 Council elections 
served an excellent example of how grassroots movements can counter the limitless 
wallets of corporate power through the democratic process. While Amazon invariably 
shelled out more money than any single campaign raised in an attempt to replace the 
local government with candidates that would behave more favorably toward the 
megacorporation, the mobilization of Seattle’s voters to protect the democratic process 
succeeded. Although the victory itself was small in a global context, it suggests an 
emerging, broader voter attitude that challenges corporate power and brings hope to a 
restoration of cities and country for people rather than capital. To the extent that this 
could lead to ‘counter’ or ‘reverse’ modes of governmentality, where the people 
discipline corporations to act on behalf of the well-being of the greater population, 
remains to be seen. However, if such a movement were to occur, it is out of moments like 
this that make such movements possible. 
Conclusion 
The rapid rollout of redevelopment of almost three-quarters of the area 
surrounding Amazon’s campus in Seattle over the last twenty years, and the influx of 
 
8 A quote from James Gurney’s Dinotopia comes to mind: “one raindrop raises the sea.” 
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people into the area due its growth, has witnessed a crisis in housing affordability that 
has, at its doorstep, created over 45,000 households that are severely rent-burdened and a 
homeless population of well over 11,000 people. The policies that the City has adopted to 
fight increasing rents and decreasing housing supply have all centered around the growth-
first ideology that underlays neoliberalization – it’s interpreted as roll-with-it because it is 
a policy approach that responds to the contradictions of past rounds of neoliberalization 
(rather than the welfare-state). These roll-with-it policies have done little to address the 
issues that thousands of households across Seattle face while simultaneously favoring 
developers that continue to build luxury high-rises that are out of reach to most people’s 
incomes. At the same time, a large number of units within and around SLU remain vacant 
while rents continue to rise elsewhere in the city.  
This on-the-ground situation suggests two things. First, it suggests that the 
developers creating these luxury units have enough capital in reserve that they do not 
necessarily need to profit off their new luxury towers; at least not right away. This in turn 
suggests an emerging class of ‘mega-developers,’ or developers that merely (re)develop 
based on speculation, because they have so much wealth that they can’t lose, or can stand 
to sit on vacant units until they’re eventually sold at the desired price. Indeed, to 
developers like Vulcan, who has created a $2 billion investment portfolio from real estate 
alone (www.vulcan.com) or Greystar, who owns over $32 billion in property assets 
across the world (www.greystar.com), a few hundred thousand dollars in rents not being 
claimed (right away at least) because of empty units seem trivial. To those who are 
pushed out of their homes due to increasing rents, on the other hand, units sitting empty 
seem like an inimical slap in the face. Whether this counterintuitive tendency reflects a 
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broader-scale, more generalized phenomenon is beyond the scope if this study, though is 




















CHAPTER FOUR  
Geospatial and Statistical Analyses 
In considering Amazon’s influence on the housing affordability crisis further, I 
utilized two modes of quantitative analysis to supplement the qualitative analysis 
presented in the previous chapter. These quantitative methods were employed in both a 
GIS environment as well as IBM SPSS using parcel-scale data to examine increases in 
land value within SLU and Belltown. Amazon’s campus is situated in the heart of these 
two neighborhoods (Figure 4) which have experienced average land value increases of 
nearly 490% between 2005 and 2019. First, heat maps of parcel land values were created 
to visualize the spatial patterns of land values and determine if and how they have 
changed since Amazon arrived on the scene. An optimized hotspot analysis was used 
using the same data to determine whether these patterns were statistically significant.  
It should be stressed that, while cluster analyses are a common tool in the natural 
and social sciences, few studies, if any, apply hotspot analyses to the market values of 
urban space. As such, this research also investigates the applicability and efficacy of 
implementing this mode of analysis in this particular context. In short, what this method 
offered was visual evidence of statistically significant clustering of land values around 
Amazon’s campus. Therefore, this assessment justified the incorporation of the corporate 
campus as an independent variable in a statistical regression model. I then ran a multiple 
linear regression in IBM SPSS to see what spatial and demographic variables best explain 
increased land values within the study area. I now describe these methods in detail, 






While the affordability crisis can be thought of in terms of high rents acting as a 
barrier to housing, there are a few problems that come with using rent data. The biggest 
problem is that census-based rent data is only available at the tract level. This creates 
issues attributable to the Map Areal Unit Problem; that is, the on-the-ground patterns of 
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rents cannot be understood in the context of aggregate data at the tract level. 
Additionally, while current rent data are available through Zillow at the street level, time 
constraints for this mode of data collection circumscribed this as a meaningful research 
path. However, rents can be implicated through official land values – the higher the 
assessed value of a parcel, the higher the rent that landowners can demand. This is 
unlikely a one-to-one relationship, of course, as a landowner is compelled by profit-
maximizing imperatives to command the largest returns of investment that they can. The 
actual rents an individual parcel-owner can command does not matter for the quantitative 
portion of this analysis, however, because I am focused on the affordability crisis in 
general, and not the rent-seeking behaviors of individual landowners (which was the 
focus of the previous chapter). Therefore, these methods operate under the assumption 
that higher land values equate with higher rents, with spatial clusters of the highest land 
values implying the highest rents.9  
The City’s Clerk Office provided a neighborhoods layer through the Seattle Open 
GIS Portal, seen in Figure 5. Amazon’s Seattle campus is located primarily within the 
neighborhoods of SLU and Belltown, both situated just north of the Central Business 
District. It should be noted that the neighborhoods the City Clerk’s Office uses are not 
consistent with the neighborhoods used by local media, which the City refers to as Urban 
Villages (Figure 6). For instance, the neighborhood of Belltown incorporates three urban 
 
9 While the relationship between land value and rent may hold true for commercial office space, this 
research is curtailed to the question of rising rents in the context of residential properties. At the parcel 
level commercial and residential properties are not differentiated due to the mixed-use characteristics of 
most of the new developments in the area. Commercial office space may also exhibit increasing rents, but 
this does not directly contribute to the affordability crisis as they are not residential units. These analyses 
therefore operate under the additional assumption that the spatial patterns of land values reflect the spatial 




villages: Belltown, the Denny Triangle, and a small portion of the Commercial Core. 
Similarly, the neighborhood of SLU includes the urban village of SLU and part of 
Uptown.10   
Figure 5 




10 The distinction between City neighborhoods and Urban Villages may be considered in future studies to 




Study Area and Surrounding Urban Villages 
 
Parcel Data and Amazon’s Campus 
King County GIS Open Data provided 2019 parcel data as a public-access 
shapefile. The shapefile included comprehensive tax information, including taxpayer 
information and assessed values, zoning, levy districts, and full addresses for all parcels, 
among other attributes. Past data are archived by the county and are unavailable to the 
public. Matt Parsons, a GIS analyst from the University of Washington, was able to 
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obtain and share past county-wide parcel data for the purposes of this research. Many of 
the files were incomplete or unusable, but the parcel layer for 2005 was complete and 
provides an excellent point-in-time comparison with the present. Appendix A provides 
more specific details about the parcel data layers used in the analyses.  
The study area, seen as the red boundary in Figures 4 & 6, was exported from the 
neighborhood layer via select query and the parcel layers were clipped to the new study 
area boundary. The 2019 parcel layer was used to identify Amazon’s campus, due to 
boundary differences between the 2005 and 2019 parcel layers. Buildings used for 
Amazon’s campus, both owned and leased, were identified via Google maps and Google 
image searches and assigned to the 2019 parcel layer by adding a new attribute field 
(values of ‘1’ were assigned to Amazon buildings and ‘0’ to all others via the field 
calculator). The parcels defined as part of the Amazon campus were then exported as a 
separate layer (Figure 4). 
Heat Maps 
I exported both the 2005 and 2019 parcel layers to point feature classes in order to 
generate heat maps of land values (Figure 7). I did this in order to identify any changes in 
the spatial patterns of land values through time corresponded to the appearance and 
spatial situatedness of Amazon. As visually evidenced, the areas with the highest land 







Heat Maps of Land Values in the Study Area
 
Note. Amazon’s campus was nonexistent in 2005 but is rather used as reference. 
Optimized Hot Spot Analysis 
To see if the visual clustering of high land values around the Amazon campus 
were statistically significant, I used the optimized hot spot analysis tool in ArcGIS using 
each of the parcel polygon layers. Optimized hotspot analysis is a form of spatial 
statistics that identifies statistically significant hot and cold spots by automatically 
calculating a Getis-Ord Gi* statistic for each feature that produces z-scores and p-values, 
along with confidence intervals. High z-scores and small p-values denote clusters of high 
values, while clusters of low values are signified by low negative z-scores and small p-
values (ESRI).  
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I used the assessed land values as the analysis field, opposed to taxable land 
values because many parcels, such as state-owned parcels, may not necessarily be taxed 
but nonetheless have exchange value. The results of these analyses are displayed in 
Figure 8. The hot spots are seen in red, with the darkest reds signifying clusters of 
significantly higher land values and the darkest blues representing clusters of 
significantly lower land values. In 2005, much of SLU is seen as a cold spot, concomitant 
with the period that Vulcan continued buying up cheap land. The clusters of highest land 
values are seen along the westernmost point of Belltown, which is close to Uptown and 
Queen Anne, as well as near the Commercial Core of downtown. Nearly 15 years later, 
patterns of property values with the study area changed. The hotspot of land values has 
extended from the Commercial Core up through much of Amazon’s campus through the 
Denny Triangle, as well as much of the center of SLU. The clusters of significantly lower 
land values in 2019 seem to reside in a large pocket of Belltown, away from Amazon’s 










Figure 8  
Results of the Optimized Hot Spot Analyses 
 
The visual clustering of significantly higher land values around Amazon’s campus 
in Belltown was interpreted as a potential sign that the appearance of the campus 
influenced land values around it.11 I therefore decided to move forward with a statistical 
regression that considers Amazon’s presence as a potential predictor in increasing land 
values.    
 
 
11 One could argue that it was not a good standalone justification for incorporating Amazon into a 
regression model because the campus is located along the northern tip of the Commercial Core, which was 
a hotspot for significantly higher land values before the company’s arrival. The extension of the hotspot 
could be attributed to other growth factors, and Amazon may have just happened to capitalize on the 
growth by investing further in the area. However, the placement of the northern portion of the Amazon 
campus in SLU also coincides well with the appearance of the hotspot in SLU, and many of the campus 
buildings fall directly within the hotspot. As such, it was determined to be a potential influencing factor that 
would be considered further in a statistical regression model. 
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Multiple Linear Regression 
A multiple regression statistical model is used to predict a continuous dependent 
variable based on multiple independent variables. It also determines the amount of 
variance that is explained, as well as the relative influence of each independent variable 
on the dependent variable (Laerd Statistics, 2015). I therefore employed a multiple 
regression analysis in IBM SPSS to see what factors significantly influenced positive 
changes in land values between 2005 and 2019.12 The strength of a multiple regression 
model lies within the fact that a virtually unlimited number of factors may be considered 
as independent variables, as long as they meet certain statistical assumptions and model 
requirements. This allowed me to consider many potential predictors, including proximity 
variables (which contribute to DR1),
13 demographic and other feature-based factors 
(which potentially influence MR and AR),14 and MHA zoning types (which contribute to 
AR15).  
Data Collection 
Proximity to Amazon’s campus was considered as a potential influence on the 
increases of land values based on the results of the optimized hotspot analyses. Other 
proximity layers originally considered were the distance to water, parks, schools, 
hospitals, retail, the Space Needle, and transit (“Factors”, 2015; Striker, 2017). 
Additional potential independent variables considered were the landmark status of 
 
12 Only positive increases are considered in this analysis in order to focus on the housing affordability 
crisis, which has been based on rising rents. 
13 The locational advantages of a building can be thought of in terms of differential rent; that is, the 
proportion of rents that can be commanded based on the advantage of geographic placement, be they 
competition, accessibility, proximity to a scarce resource, or other advantage.  
14 Refer back to chapter two for a thorough discussion on the forms of MR and AR.  
15 Refer to the previous chapter for a thorough discussion on how MHA creates and sustains AR. 
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buildings within parcels (“Factors”, 2015), demographic data for the area, the MHA 
zoning fees, and of course developers, who play an active role in increasing land values 
by physically changing the built environment to close rent gaps (Smith, 1996; Weber, 
2002). These are summarized in Table 3 and Appendix A. 
Table 3  








Dependent Variable   
Increase in Land Value Positive difference 
between assessed land 
values, 2005 - 2019 
KCGIS Open Data 
Independent Variables   
Proximity   
Amazon Distance to Amazon 
Campus 
Author Generated 
Water Distance to Waterfront KCGIS Open Data 
Parks Distance to Parks KCGIS Open Data 
Schools Distance to Schools Seattle Open GIS 
Portal 
Hospitals Distance to Hospitals KCGIS Open Data 
Retail Distance to Retail KCGIS Open Data 
Transit Distance to Transit Stops KCGIS Open Data, 
Seattle Open GIS 
Portal 
Space Needle Distance to Space Needle Author Generated 
Demographics   
Race Percent White  US Census Bureau 
Sex Percent Male US Census Bureau 
Age Percent Middle Aged US Census Bureau 
Housing by Tenure Percent Renter Occupied US Census Bureau 




Developer ownership Nominal Binary Variable Author Generated 
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Landmark Status Nominal Binary Variable National Park 
Service 
MHA Residential Pay 
Option 
Price per Square Foot for 
Residential Development 




MHA Commercial Pay 
Option 
Price per Square Foot for 
Commercial Development 






Data Processing and Preparation 
Parcels   
The 2019 parcel layer was used as the basis for a ‘master layer’ of which all other 
spatial variables were joined (via spatial or table joins). King County uses a system of 
unique PINs to identify and track parcels. The 2005 parcel layer was joined to the 2019 
parcel layer using a table join based on the PIN field. However, parcel boundaries in the 
2005 data contained 103 more polygons than the 2019 layer. This was the result of parcel 
aggregation (Figure 9). To account for the missing polygons, I replaced the PIN attributes 
for the 103 2005 parcels with the 2019 PIN attribute values from the aggregates. To do 
this, I chose a single 2005 polygon to replace its current PIN and replaced its appraised 
land value with the sum total of all smaller parcels within that block. This corrected the 
geometry issues and preserved accurate land value estimations. Several dozen parcels 
remained unmatched and were subsequently dismissed as likely the result of clerical 
errors. The several dozen remaining unmatched parcels were mostly new condos and 
apartments, with a few hotels and office buildings. Since Amazon does not own or lease 
any of these, I did not believe their exclusion to have any dramatic effect on the results of 
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the analysis. I then deleted duplicate polygons within the dataset that were also likely the 
result of clerical errors. The resulting layer contained a total of 903 parcels. 
Figure 9 
2005 and 2019 Parcel Layers 
 
To determine which parcels increased in land values between 2005 and 2019 (i.e., 
the basis for the dependent variable), a new field was created in the parcel layer and the 
field calculator was used to subtract the 2005 land values from the 2019 land values. Of 
the 903 parcels, 35 of them either decreased or had no change in values and were 
subsequently deleted from the dataset to narrow the focus of analysis to only parcels that 
increased in value over time. This yielded a sample size of 868 parcels.   
Proximity Variables  
Proximity to Amazon campus  
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To determine each parcel’s proximity to Amazon’s campus I generated a multiple 
ring buffer at intervals of 100 feet up to 4,000 feet, and 500 feet up to 10,000, with a final 
ring of 5,000 feet radius for a total of 15,000 feet (although the longest distance between 
points in the study area is under 11,000 feet). These intervals are used for all proximity 
layers for consistency and referred to as proximity intervals. The new buffer rings layer 
was spatially joined to the master file based on minimum distance. The choice to base the 
spatial join on minimum distance was arbitrary but intuitive because hypothetically, a 
building owner could claim a residence is only 100 feet from a given feature (even if only 
the corner of the building closest to the feature was actually within that distance).   
Proximity to water 
Following Cho, Bowker & Park (2006) and Major & Lusht, (2004), there is a 
tendency for property near water to have higher market values than properties farther 
inland.16 A waterbody shapefile was downloaded from King County Open Data and 
clipped to a one-mile buffer of the study area. I then used the same buffer and join 
methods used with the Amazon proximity variable.  
Proximity to parks, schools & hospitals, and the Space Needle 
King County Open Data provided a “Parks in King County” polygon shapefile 
that I clipped to the study area. For schools, I gathered a Public School point shapefile 
from Seattle Open GIS Data. The shapefile includes high schools, alternative high 
 
16 An additional consideration pertaining to waterbodies were the variable views of the Sound from each 
building, especially with respect to rooftop views. As is stands there are no height data for City buildings, 
so this is acknowledged as a potential limitation and should be considered in future analyses. 
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schools, as well as grade schools.17 I clipped these to the same buffered study area layer 
as the water layer.  
For proximity to hospitals and other medical facilities, I obtained a Medical 
Facilities point file from King County Open Data. This was clipped to the same buffered 
study area layer as the school and water layers. While facilities like dental offices are not 
differentiated from hospitals, it is assumed here that any type of medical facility will 
likely have some sort of effect on land values and is therefore not necessary to distinguish 
the type of facility. For the Space Needle, I used a satellite imagery basemap to create a 
point shapefile representing its location. For all four proximity layers, I ran multiple ring 
buffers using the proximity intervals and spatially joined the new layers to the parcel 
layer based on minimum distance.  
Proximity to retail 
Retail is indeed considered an important determinant of land values (“Factors”, 
2015), especially where it is geographically sparse. However, the majority of SLU and 
Belltown are zoned as mixed commercial and residential, and a walk down any street will 
find that street level retail is nearly ubiquitous throughout the study area. This variable 
was thus deemed a constant and excluded from the analysis.  
Proximity to transit 
Seattle has a diverse array of public transit, including a complex metro bus 
system, a Streetcar, a monorail, and a light rail. From the Seattle Open GIS Portal I 
 
17 I realized later that the Cornish College of Arts is located along the northwestern edge of the Denny 
Triangle. It is possible that including this in the schools layer may have affected, at least in a minor way, 
the outcome of the analysis, and as such is potentially a weakness that could be resolved in a future study. 
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downloaded a Streetcar Stations shapefile, and from King County Open Data a shapefile 
of transit stops. Conveniently, the transit stop points included all points along the light 
rail and monorail, so additional data were not needed. However, the streetcar stations 
from Seattle Open Data were at slightly separate stops and judging from my experience 
on the ground in Seattle I would expect them to be slightly spaced out, as are reflected in 
the data. I performed a merge between the two layers and followed the same methods 
with previous proximity variables to buffer and join them to the parcel layer.  
Demographics 
American Community Factfinder (U.S. Census Bureau) provided block level 
census data for 2010. These data included vacancy status, race, sex by age, and housing 
by tenure. A TIGER block shapefile was also downloaded and each demographic table 
was spatially joined using the geographic identifiers.  
The incorporation of these block group data into larger scale parcel data posed an 
issue of scale, as all parcels in a block will be assigned the same values. For instance, if 
there are eight parcels in a single block, and that block has 10 females aged 30-34, then 
the parcel file would suggest that within that block are 80 females aged 30-34, which we 
know is not true. This is overcome by using percentage values of variables, rather than 
counts. For example, if a given block contains 75% males, then each parcel within that 
block will show that it is comprised of a 75% male population. For the following census 
variables, each new field variable was exported to a new feature class and joined to the 
parcel layer using the join option where each polygon is assigned the attributes of the 




The Census records a large number of different race classifications, from single 
races to multiple races. However, Seattle is a white majority, with the largest proportions 
of nonwhites located along the eastern and southern peripheries of the city. Since SLU 
and Belltown are thus neighborhoods with a white majority, I aggregated all the various 
race data into a single variable by creating an attribute field for the percentage of white 
people. Using the field calculator, I calculated this via the equation 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒 =
𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
∗ 100.  
Sex & age 
Sex and age are combined into one category by the census, and age intervals are 
not consistent, ranging anywhere between one to four years per interval. To separate the 
variables of sex and age I created new fields that aggregated age groups into generational 
groups based on Dimcock’s (2019) generational definitions. I calculated the years each 
age group in the census data were born and used field calculator to partition them into 
new fields of Generation Z, Millennials, Generation X, Boomers, Silent Generation, and 
The Greatest Generation. This was done for both the male and female age groups in the 
Census data. To create a single field variable for percent male, I added a new field and 
used field calculator with the equation percent male =  (male Gen Z + male Millennial + 
male Gen X + male Boomer + male Silent Gen + male Greatest Gen)/(male Gen Z + 
male Millennial + male Gen X + male Boomer + male Silent Gen + male Greatest Gen 
+ female Gen Z + female Millennial + female Gen X + female Boomer + female Silent 
Gen + female Greatest Gen) * 100.  
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Given the understanding that as a relatively younger generation Millennials do not 
carry the same socioeconomic legacies in the built environment as those of Generation X 
or above, a single variable classified as Percent Middle Aged was used.18 I used the 
following equation in field calculator: percent middle aged = (male Gen X + male 
Boomer + male Silent Gen + male Greatest Gen + female Gen X + female Boomer + 
female Silent Gen + female Greatest Gen) / (male Gen Z + male Millennial + male Gen 
X + male Boomer + male Silent Gen + male Greatest Gen + female Gen Z + female 
Millennial + female Gen X + female Boomer + female Silent Gen + female Greatest 
Gen) * 100.  
Housing by tenure 
The Census tracks several different types of housing tenure, but the most 
important type for this analysis was considered renter occupancy, as opposed to owner 
occupied with loans or mortgages, or owner occupied free and clear. A new field was 
added and populated with field calculator using the equation 
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑 =  
𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑏𝑦 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒
∗ 100.  
Vacancy 
Vacancy data provided by the Census offers myriad types of vacancy, including 
vacancies for rent, for sale, seasonal vacancies, among others. While the renter vacancies 
in 2010 are by no means the rental vacancies of 16-17% that we see today, it is 
nonetheless included in the analysis due to the lack of current data as the percentage of 
 
18 Percent Middle Aged, in this analysis, may be more accurately considered ‘middle-aged and up’ as it 
incorporates the Silent Generation and the Greatest Generation. 
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vacancies for rent. After adding a new field to the census attribute table, the percentage 




∗ 100.  
Additional Independent Variables  
Developer ownership 
Landownership by individual developers was used in the regression model as 
potential predictors of land value due to the ability of developers to increase land values 
through redevelopment. Recording individual developers was done through a parcel-by-
parcel identification scheme of landowners chiefly via Google searches of the tax-paying 
entities recorded in the 2019 parcel layer. The names of landowning companies were 
recorded in a new field in the attribute table.19 Common websites that helped me find 
information on properties included, but were not limited to: the daily journal of 
commerce (djc.com), bizjournals.com, Seattle Post Intelligencer, Seattle In Progress, 
Seattle Times, Bisnow.com, GeekWire.com, discoverSLU.com, officespace.com, 
redfin.com, 42floors.com, city-data.com, sec.gov, opengovwa.com, yellowpages.com, 
linkedin, wa-registry.com, opencorporates.com, seattle.curbed.com, campusbuilding.com, 
loopnet.com, skyscrapercenter.com, urbanash.com, buzzbuzzhome.com, 
continentalseattle.com, homemetry.com, kidder.com, and worldcat.org. After landowners 
were identified and recorded an additional field was created in the parcel layer for 
 
19 Using the Google search engine to look up tax-paying entities did not always yield fruitful information 
because developers frequently hide behind mysterious LLCs and are thus hidden from the public eye. 
Sometimes, but not always, the addresses of the LLCs are tied to a parent development company, as is the 
case with the two dozen or so LLCs through which Vulcan operates (City Investors I, II, III, etc.). Address 
searches for parcels with little information on taxpayers were also used to investigate ownership data. 
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developers with assigned field values of ‘1’ for developers and ‘0’ for non-developers. 
This field was used in the analysis as a nominal independent variable.  
Landmark status 
An additional potential nominal independent variable I considered was landmark 
status of the parcels within the study area. Historic landmark data is not available from 
the City or County, but a national geospatial dataset exists through the National Park 
Service. From examining this layer in a GIS environment, it was observed that less than a 
dozen parcels have landmark status out of the entire 977 parcels in the study area. A 
landmark variable was therefore not included in the analysis.  
MHA performance options 
The MHA performance options and pay-in-lieu fees for SLU and Belltown are 
much lower than the citywide MHA regulations as an incentive to developers to 
concentrate growth within the SLU and downtown areas. These performance options, as 
well as the fees, are contained within Chapter 23 of the City Municipal Code where I 
accessed and recorded them. These are available in Appendix B. While the pay-in-lieu 
options for residential and commercial developments could have been included in the 
analysis as well, their values are fairly consistent with the performance options and were 
excluded from the analysis to avoid issues of collinearity.20 The King County parcel layer 
included a zoning attribute field that utilizes the same codification scheme as the 
Municipal Code, and I was able to join these data to the parcel layer using a table join. 
However, this is where the boundary issues alluded to at the beginning of the chapter 
 
20 There may in fact be some important differences between the payment and performance options that may 
be explored in future analyses.  
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cropped up. Specifically, the portion of the study area that falls within Uptown, and much 
of the stretch of SLU that stretches along the southeast shore of Lake Union, do not fall 
within the MHA Zoning area for SLU and downtown. After performing the table join, I 
therefore deleted all parcels with null values in the MHA Zoning fields. The final sample 
size was 751 parcels (Figure 10).   
Figure 10 





The final dataset was exported from ArcGIS as a comma separate values (CSV) 
file and imported into IBM SPSS for the analysis. Following Laerd Statistics (2015), the 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients (r-value) of the variables were examined to determine 
the strength and direction of the linear relationships between the dependent and 
independent variables. The Pearson’s correlation coefficients are contained in Appendix 
C. Correlations between individual independent variables showed that the census-based 
variables were all highly correlated with one another. This was attributable to an 
abundance of missing data values that were recorded as ‘0’. I therefore deleted all the 
data points that had missing census data. This significantly reduced the correlations 
between census variables and resulted in a reduced sample size of 459 parcels. To resolve 
the issue of low r-values between the dependent and independent variables, I tried various 
transformations of all the variables using square roots, logarithms, and inverse functions. 
From these transformations, I tested a total of 16 combinations of transformed variables, 
displayed in Table 4. Many of the combinations displayed in Table 4 improved the 
correlation r-values for the independent variables. Proximity to Hospitals, however, had 
consistently low r-values throughout the transformations and was removed from analysis.  
Table 4  









Untransformed (y) Untransformed (x) 
- Logarithm (log 𝑥) 
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Logarithm (log 𝑦) Untransformed (x) 
- Logarithm (log 𝑥) 





Square root (√𝑦) Untransformed (x) 
- Logarithm (log 𝑥) 








) Untransformed (x) 
- Logarithm (log 𝑥) 







The final model also excluded the variables of race, parks, and housing by tenure 
in order to improve the R square values, i.e., the percentage of variance explained by the 
model. Variables in the final regression model are displayed in Table 5.   
Table 5 






Dependent Variable  
Square Root of the Increase in 
Land Value 
Square Root of the Positive 
Difference Between Assessed 
Land Values, 2005 – 2019 
Independent Variables  
Proximity  
Amazon Distance to Amazon Campus 
Water Distance to Waterfront 
Schools Distance to Schools 
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Transit Distance to Transit Stops 
Space Needle Distance to Space Needle 
Demographics  
Sex Percent Male 
Age Percent Middle Aged 




Developer ownership Nominal Binary Variable 
MHA Residential Pay Option Price per Square Foot for 
Residential Development Based 
on MHA Zoning 
MHA Commercial Pay 
Option 
Price per Square Foot for 
Commercial Development 




The goal of the multiple regression analysis was to predict the increase in the 
square root of land value from the square footage of the parcel, the distance of a parcel 
from the nearest school, the distance of a parcel from the Space Needle, the distance of a 
parcel from the nearest transit stop, the distance of a parcel from the nearest waterfront, 
the distance of a parcel to Amazon’s campus, the percentage of the population in a parcel 
that is male, the percent of the population in a parcel that is middle aged, the percentage 
of a parcel that has vacancies for rent, the MHA performance option for residential 
development for a given parcel, the MHA performance option for commercial 
development for a given parcel, and the developer-ownership status of a parcel. There 
was linearity as assessed by partial regression plots and a plot of studentized residuals 
against the predicted values. There was not independence of residuals as assessed by a 
Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.577, but this was determined to be acceptable as the samples 
are not ordered (Field, 2018). There was homoscedasticity, as assessed by visual 
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inspection of a plot of studentized residuals versus unstandardized predicted values. 
There was no evidence of multicollinearity, as assessed by tolerance values greater than 
0.1. There were studentized deleted residuals greater than +/- 3 standard deviations, but 
this was considered acceptable because the data are naturally occurring (e.g., they were 
not the result of recording errors). There were no leverage values greater than 0.2 and 
Cook’s distance values were around 1. The assumption of normality was met, as assessed 
by a Q-Q Plot. The multiple regression model was statistically significant, F(12, 446) = 
116.252, p < .001, adj. R2 = .751. Nine of 13 variables added statistical significance to the 
prediction, p < .05. Regression coefficients and standard errors can be found in Table 6. 
Table 6 






B 95% CI for B SE B Β R2 ΔR2 
  LL UL 
 
    
Model      .758 .751*** 




.072*** .068 .077 .002 .776***   
Proximity 
to School 








-.43 -1.019 .159 .300 -.039   
Proximity 
to Water 







-.110 -.233 .013 .063 -.060   
Percent 
Male 
























141.601** 41.328 241.874 51.022 .065**   
Note. Model = “Enter” method in SPSS Statistics; B = unstandardized regression 
coefficient; CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit; UL = upper limit; SE B = standard 
error of the coefficient; β = standardized coefficient; R2 = coefficient of determination; 
ΔR2 = adjusted R2.  *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
The final model that predicts the square root of an increase in land value for the 
time period between 2005 and 2019 takes the form of (12) (below). 
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√ 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  
=  1912.058 +  (.072 x 𝑆𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑜𝑡)  
+  (.155 x 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜l) −  (.094 x 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑙𝑒)  
−  (.43 x 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑝)  
+  (.122 x 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑁𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑡)  
−  (.110 x 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐴𝑚𝑎𝑧𝑜𝑛’𝑠 𝐶𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑢𝑠)  +  (2.968 x 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒)  
−  (5.967 x 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑀𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑑) −  (1.45 x 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝐹𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡)  
−  (199.669 x 𝑀𝐻𝐴 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)  
+  (26.537 x 𝑀𝐻𝐴 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)  
+  (141.601 x 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠) 
     (12) 
Discussion 
Insignificant Variables 
The model provides important insights about the significant factors that have 
potentially influenced the affordability crisis by focusing on the increase in land values 
within the study area. The proximity to transit stops and the percent vacancies of rental 
properties, for instance, do not appear to be significant, nor does the gender makeup of 
the area. Most importantly to my focus, however, is that the proximity to Amazon’s 
campus is not a statistically significant predictor over an increase in the market value of 
parcels within the study area and over the 14-year period between 2005 and 2019.  
The overall significance of the model does not necessitate the removal of 
insignificant variables. Indeed, their coefficients, many of which are relatively small 
compared to the coefficients of the significant variables, still have a large impact on the 
actual land values because the dependent variable is the square root of values that are in 
the millions of dollars. For instance, the coefficient for the Distance to Amazon is -.110. 
This means for every foot increase away from its campus, the DV decreases by a factor 
of approximately one-tenth. If a given parcel is 100 feet away from the campus, the 
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increase of the square root of the market value would be ten times less, or 100 times less 
of the real market value, than it would have been if it were next-door to the campus, all 
other variables remaining constant. This predictor is not significant, however, and we can 
thus make the following inference: the model shows that the proximity to Amazon within 
the study area does not significantly predict an increase in land values for the period of its 
development, meaning that Amazon has likely not caused the price of housing to increase 
directly. Rather, the move of its megalithic campus in SLU and Belltown was likely a 
consequence of the growth strategies implemented by the City’s growth machine. This 
implies that Amazon was merely situated strategically within a rapidly valorizing 
business district. The influence possessed by Amazon to potentially steer other tech firms 
into SLU was outside of the scope of this study, but I would suggest that other corporate 
tech giants such as Facebook and Google likely entered the scene due to the successful 
establishment of Amazon’s own campus.   
Furthermore, the spatial constraints of this study may not have captured the true 
extent of Amazon’s influence on the Seattle housing market more broadly. With the 
influx of 85,000 new residents (Le, 2018), there is no question that the strain on the 
housing supply has resulted in a citywide housing affordability crisis. A quantitative 
analysis of the proportion of new residents that flocked to Seattle with the specific 
intention of working for Amazon, and the role that those jobs have specifically had on 
increasing the crisis, is left as a topic for further research as these questions exceed the 
scope of this project.  
The attempt to quantify Amazon’s effect on the affordability crisis based on its 
geospatial location has thus failed to produce a conclusive result, and as such Amazon 
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cannot be deemed a culprit based solely on this quantitative analysis. However, other 
important insights can be drawn from the regression results with respect to the 
development of SLU and Belltown. Before considering these insights and the importance 
of the statistically significant predictor variables I will briefly discuss the other variables 
that were insignificant.  
The statistical insignificance of the gender variable was expected for several 
reasons. First, there are few, if any, studies that support the gender makeup of a 
neighborhood influencing land values. This was incorporated in the study as more of a 
means to consider all possible factors that might influence the increase in land values. 
Second, a lack of data for the study area may have also played a minor role, as block data 
for much of SLU is missing from the 2010 census data. This is likely because these data 
were collected during the early onset of development throughout the study area. Many of 
the high-rise towers that exist today in SLU were nothing more than parking lots and 
empty warehouses in 2010. Although the analysis excluded all parcels with census values 
of “0,” this may have nonetheless played a role in obfuscating the influence of gender in 
the analysis, if any exists at all. To work around these problems, a future citywide 
regression analysis may hold merit in discovering the true impact of gender (and race) on 
land values.  
The insignificance of the distance to transit stops is also not surprising due to the 
well-lubricated transit system in Seattle. The true impact of this variable at the citywide 
scale may be concealed, however, as transit stops are a homogenous feature of SLU and 
Belltown but are not necessarily so across the City. A citywide analysis of the 
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relationship between the spatial proximity to Metro transit stations and land values in 
future studies may likewise unveil a significance not observed in this analysis.  
The vacancies of rental properties, as with all other demographic data, are now a 
decade old and as such are outdated. The insignificance of rental vacancy as a predictor 
variable points, however, to the possibility that the expected logic of supply and demand 
does not apply in this context. As noted, this may very well be due to the fact that many 
of the development firms that own much of the luxury housing supply have multi-billion-
dollar portfolios and can therefore afford to sit on empty units until they are filled, 
regardless of housing supply shortages.  
The last insignificant independent variable was the MHA performance options for 
commercial developments. Interestingly, while this was not a significant variable, the 
performance options for residential developments were significant. As seen in Figure 11, 
there are a few discrepancies between the two. Following the assumption that lower rates 
are used to encourage development in certain zones, the first noticeable difference are the 
rates themselves – as an incentive to maximize overall housing, the residential 
performance options are markedly low for all of SLU and much of Belltown, increasing 
as one moves further west into Belltown and away from SLU. This encourages residential 
developers to cluster wherever the lowest performance rates are as a profit-maximizing 
imperative. The patterns for commercial development are similar, although there are 
greater incentives (via lower rates) along the northwest portion of Belltown where it 
borders with Queen Anne. Also noteworthy is the cluster of parcels within this area that 
have the lowest commercial rates, but highest residential. This can be interpreted as a 
deliberate attempt by the city to focus commercial development in this particular block, 
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for whatever reason. Similarly, the City encourages some blocks in SLU for commercial 
development more than others. The specific reasons why some blocks are prioritized for 
commercial development more than others are outside the scope of this study. However, 
there are a few important implications that can be made from the statistically significant 
residential MHA variable (see below). 
Figure 11 
MHA Performance Options Within Study Area 
 
Note. Missing data in parcels are the result of zoning in which either the MHA does not 






From the variables in the regression that were statistically significant several 
important inferences are made. First, while the square footage of a given lot is significant, 
the magnitude of its influence is markedly low, which suggests that within the study area 
the size of a parcel does not affect its market value to the same extent as other attributes. 
Likewise, the distance from public schools, and even the Space Needle, have had 
minimal impact on increasing values. While the distance to water is significant, the 
results suggest that the further a parcel is from water, the more the land increased in 
value. This is likely due to the fact that the highest increases of land values have 
primarily occurred within the relative center of the area (Figures 7 & 8), which is situated 
between Lake Union and the Puget Sound. Although statistically significant, this 
independent variable is an unreliable determinant of value increases because higher land 
values near water bodies is generally a static feature (as seen in Figure 7, where land 
values can be seen as higher closer to the Sound in 2005). Given the understanding that 
broad swaths of the study area that has been redeveloped since 2005 were mainly parking 
lots and warehouses before redevelopment, a citywide analysis in future research could 
shed further light on the role of proximity to the Sound (and other waterbodies) on 
increasing land values.  
The percentage of middle-aged residents was also statistically significant and 
affected the square root of the increases in land value by a factor of -6, suggesting that the 
greater proportion of Millennials and Zoomers, the greater the increase in land value. 
This is an odd finding, but likely not very useful considering that the census data are 
dated by a decade. It is therefore my opinion that this variable, like most of the census-
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derived variables, may be ignored but considered in future research when updated block-
level demographic data are available.  
The most significant variables in the regression analysis were the MHA 
performance options for residential development and the developer-ownership status of a 
given parcel. These two interrelated variables affect the increase of the square root of 
land values at large magnitudes, and as such deserve special attention. First, the 
ownership status of a given parcel by a developer increased the dependent variable by a 
factor of 144, meaning that the square root of the increase on land values are likely to be 
144 times higher under developer ownership than not. This is intuitive in that the 
majority of SLU has been redeveloped over the last two decades as developers have 
sought to close existing rent gaps (see Figure 3). As mentioned, a total of 72% of 
developable space in the study area has been redeveloped since 2001. While future 
analysis may consider the year that a parcel finished construction as a potential 
independent variable, the ownership status alone by developers serves as a striking 
elucidation of how developers have advantageously closed rent gaps through 
redevelopment.  
Furthermore, the square root of the increase in land values decrease by a factor of 
199.7 for every percent increase of the MHA performance option. Similar to developer-
ownership, this influences the increase in land values by a large margin compared to the 
other variables. Considering that the mean value of the dependent variable is over $2,200, 
a hypothetical increase in MHA inclusionary regulations of 11% would equate to no 
increase in land value, rendering the prospect of redevelopment within the study area a 
nonprofitable venture. Indeed, performance rates are restricted in SLU to up to 5%, 
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whereas citywide rates can range anywhere from 5 to 11% (City of Seattle Housing 
Affordability and Livability Agenda, 2019). This implies that growth in SLU under MHA 
necessitated careful and precise planning and cooperation between developers and the 
City in order to encourage perpetual development within the boundary of the study area, 
as implicated in the previous chapter, and thereby attributing a significant role to CMR in 
SLUs redevelopment. That the MHA performance option hit with statistical significance 


















The results of both the qualitative and quantitative analyses draw important 
conclusions regarding the role that Amazon has played with respect to rising rents and the 
housing affordability crisis in the Emerald City. While the quantitative analysis employed 
in this study failed to show a statistically significant relationship between the 
megacorporation and rents, other important insights were found that have had significant 
effects in the housing market. Additionally, through a comprehensive examination of the 
(re)development of ‘Amazonia’, the company was implicated as a guiding force of 
rationalized neoliberal logic that helped sustain the particular class-monopoly regime 
invested in SLU through several examples of nefarious corporate activism. This activism 
backfired on the corporate mammon, however, revealing early signs of a (possible) 
emerging political revolution based on a large-scale grassroots movement, witnessed in 
the early campaign trail of Senator Sanders and currently exemplified by the nationwide 
BLM protests in general and the Capitol Hill Autonomous Zone (CHAZ) in Seattle in 
particular. In a country that has been consistently friendly to corporate profits over 
people, and increasingly welcoming to fascist, right-wing ideologies, the example of the 
City Council elections in 2019 show signs of hope for a more progressive future, if one is 
possible at all.  
 In what follows I will draw upon some of the most critical insights brought about 
through the qualitative analysis, emphasizing those which are further supported (if not 
verified) by the results of the statistical regression model. I will then discuss some of the 
broader contributions of this thesis to the literature on rent, neoliberalization and 
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applications of critical GIS. The results of the critical discourse analysis found the 
circumstances of class monopoly rent in SLU and Belltown to not only be present, but 
prevalent. The active collaboration between developers (having infiltrated SLUFAN, the 
mayor’s office, and the City Council itself through PAC funding) and the City allow both 
public and private factions to maximize their own capture of circulating surplus value 
through rents – developers, by paying minimal MHA fees and exploiting the 
neoliberalized deregulation of zoning codes (thereby enhancing their bottom line, or 
ARD), and the City through the appropriation of enhanced property tax revenue (ARS). 
The MHA, along with the LCLIP TIF (operating under the flag of environmental 
conservation), ultimately serve the landowning class while widening and deepening the 
gap of inequality felt by the rest of the population. 
The influence of MHA on the increased land values within the study area are 
therefore interpreted as attributable to AR. ARD is implicated insofar as MHA (and 
LCLIP) works to the collective advantage of all developers invested in SLU and is the 
result of developer-friendly public policy. MHA effectively works to not only increase 
the maximum number of luxury units within a given tower, but to opt out of the inclusion 
of rent-restricted housing, instead reserving all units for renters that can afford the luxury 
prices, building on impacts of the LCLIP TIF. ARS is implicated insofar as the state, 
having allowed developers to build taller and pricier rental units, are able to claim higher-
than-otherwise property tax revenue through the increased market values that upzoning 
stimulates. As a particular SLU growth machine/class-monopoly formation, both the state 
and developers are able to feed off one another in this way, perpetuating growth and 
through it higher and higher AR to the extent that these actors are collaborating within a 
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confined (and thus, inherently limited) housing sub-market. The aggregation of ARD, 
ARS, and ARF (the interest garnered to lenders via their investments in these particular 
developments, TIF, etc.) constitutes the CMR associated with this particular circumstance 
of rent appropriation in Seattle’s SLU. 
Moreover, the statistical findings also revealed that all other variables that might 
have contributed to an increase in land values, and thus an increase of rents, were 
negligible compared to developer ownership and the MHA regulations. 37% of all 
developable land (40% of all parcels) in SLU and Belltown are currently owned by 
various developers, yet the land included in the statistical analysis showed the square root 
of the increase in land values over a 14-year period to be 144 times greater under 
developer ownership (in fact, many developers continue to own their developed buildings 
as landlords). By redeveloping old parking lots and obsolete buildings, developers were 
able to close rent gaps in SLU and Belltown through the production of luxury towers that 
are exclusively reserved for high income individuals working in the high tech and biotech 
industries. As new high paying jobs brought thousands of new residents to Seattle, the 
citywide housing supply became strained, and rents across the City skyrocketed. Yet, 
new residential construction near all the high tech and biotech campuses remained off-
limits to the vast majority of the working class as developers sought to not only ensure 
socially acceptable bottom-lines (ARD), but increase the amount of profit considered to 
be the socially-acceptable minimum: the profit margin deemed socially acceptable today 
is almost certainly higher than it was ten years ago. 
The City’s response, or perhaps more aptly put, contribution, to the emerging 
housing affordability crisis was to enact the MHA program, which was differentially 
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administered throughout the city so as to advantageously increase their own tax revenues 
(ARS) by favoring development of luxury housing within SLU. As I suggest, the MHA 
requirements and the amount of AR afforded to both developers and the City are 
inversely proportional. This is supported by the statistical model, where the square root of 
the increase in land value reduces by a factor of nearly 200 for every percent increase in 
inclusionary housing requirements for residential developments. In other words, the 
MHA regulations are kept just low enough in these rapidly growing areas to perpetuate 
development while sustaining the AR claimed by developers and other corporate 
landowners. Further, the exceptionally low magnitudes of the other variables’ coefficients 
in the model suggest that the proportion of rents within SLU and Belltown that are 
attributable to DR are negligible compared to AR, meaning that the particular 
circumstances of CMR within these neighborhoods reign supreme.  
 Amazon’s presence and spatial influence on its surroundings are unquestionable. 
While the regression model failed to provide statistical significance to support this, other 
corporations like Google, Facebook, Expedia, and others would likely have not entered 
the SLU scene had it not been for Amazon’s success at establishing a dominating home 
base for its global empire, thereby illustrating notable limits to quantitative analyses in 
the context of land rent theory. The political prowess the megacorporation has flexed 
through its dominance over City policy agendas has also shown it to be a corporate actor 
operating at the meso-scale (Ward and Swyngedouw, 2018), or “mid-level” strata 
(Mouton and Shatkin, 2020) of contemporary neoliberal governance, the connective-
tissue between broader national and global scale processes of neoliberalization and the 
local scale, mediated in ways in which these processes are manifest.  
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The power of Amazon has thoroughly worked to discipline not only the City of 
Seattle but other cities as well via the inter-urban competition Amazon unleashed in 
siting their second headquarters: city governments in general are disciplined to erect 
public policy favorable to not only Amazon’s interests but that of capital in general; 
otherwise, city governments (and the bulk of the urban population) risk facing an 
uncertain fate with spiraling indebtedness and low-bond ratings, with Detroit serving as 
the worst case example of what can happen when a city is completely abandoned by 
capital. In a neoliberal world where the federal government no longer buttresses local 
government budgets, cities are forced to align with capital as a means of survival, thereby 
lending considerable disciplinary power to local business and real-estate communities, 
especially megacorporations like Amazon. 
The repeal of the corporate Head Tax in 2018 serves as a perfect example of how 
corporations can flout local policies through on-the-ground interventions, reprehensible 
as they may be. Moreover, that the Head Tax was revoked meant that the nearly $50 
million per year that it would have generated for affordable housing was cancelled. While 
this contribution to citywide affordable housing is overwhelmingly small compared to the 
needs of the City’s population, the disgraceful refusal by Amazon to address the needs of 
a city in which it centers a significant base of its capital accumulation from speaks 
volumes to the pervasive priorities of capitalism in general. Furthermore, its behavior 
helped sustain the appropriation of AR by developers and corporate landowners across 
Seattle as threats to their bottom lines were extinguished insofar as the city’s housing 
supply (particularly in SLU) has remained saturated with unrestricted rental units. In this 
way, Amazon can be seen has having played a direct and pivotal role in protecting and 
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maintaining class-monopoly regimes in Seattle, whether this outcome was wittingly 
planned or not. Further, Amazon’s corporate activism not only represents the interests of 
Amazon, but the entire real estate and business communities in Seattle insofar as they all 
have one shared interest: profit maximization. Amazon can be seen as the leading 
representative for these private sector communities in general, and the class-monopoly 
regime invested in SLU in particular, considering the central positioning of Amazon’s 
campus (and employees) in SLU’s redevelopment. 
Recommendations 
 It is the author’s opinion that housing should be considered a basic human right as 
a fundamental precursor to all policy decisions. While Washington State Law bans rent 
control, the City of Seattle still has the power to mandate rent restrictions, as they have in 
the case of MHA. This means that policies championing mandatory housing affordability 
still hold pragmatic merit, as utopian alternatives are nowhere near a possibility in our 
current neoliberal state. It is therefore recommended that the City reforms their MHA 
regulations by removing the payment option completely and drastically increasing the 
performance option on new developments. Based on the evidence I have provided 
throughout this thesis it is likely that stricter regulations on developers would not slow 
the rapid pace of development. Moreover, by removing the payment options and 
increasing performance requirements, displacement of middle-income residents will 
decrease as SLU, Belltown, and other gentrifying neighborhoods slowly begin to 





This thesis serves several important contributions to ongoing research and debate. 
First and foremost, it answers Wyly’s (2011) call to critical positivism by applying 
statistical analysis to land rent theory. In doing this, it employed techniques of spatial 
analysis in a GIS environment and used the spatially derived database in statistical 
software to explore what variables have contributed to rising rents in Seattle’s SLU.  
In the process, the analysis simultaneously achieves a unique mode of ‘fence 
straddling’ (O’Sullivan, 2006) between both critical theory and GIS in a new and novel 
way in that it is the first study to empirically verify the prevalence of CMR via a mix of 
quantitative and qualitative methods (beyond the more typical role of CMR as a heuristic 
device in the rent literature). Additionally, this study empirically explores the latest phase 
of roll-with-it neoliberalization in the context of Amazonia’s intense redevelopment and 
the policies the City of Seattle has adopted that only further entrench the neoliberalization 
of the city’s social, political, and economic landscape, while failing to meet the needs of 
the people. Lastly, it identified Amazon as a glocal actor who has played an instrumental 
role at the meso-scale of ongoing roll-with-it neoliberalization processes in Seattle.  
In the wake of the BLM movement and grassroots activism taking place under the 
backdrop of a dangerous global pandemic that has seen unemployment rates at their 
highest since the Great Depression, the consequences of Seattle’s roll-with-it policies that 
have exacerbated inequality and punished the majority of people are being met with 
strong resistance. The nationwide protests, while primarily against police brutality in a 
structural racist system of oppression, reflect a broader attitude of the American people 
that are exhausted of a society that holds the priorities of corporations over people. As 
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Stacey Abrams recently said, “the day of reckoning is going to continue until we actually 
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DMC 145 $10.00  6.10% $13.00  5.10% 
DMC 170 $8.00  5.00% $5.50  2.10% 
DMC 240/290-
440 
$10.00  6.10% $8.25  3.20% 
DMC 340/290-
440 
$12.50  7.60% $8.25  3.20% 
DOC1 U/450-U $14.75  8.90% $12.00  4.70% 
DOC2 500/300-
550 
$14.25  8.60% $10.25  4.00% 
DRC 85-170 $13.50  8.20% $10.00  3.90% 
DMR/C 75/75-
95 
$8.00  5.00% $20.75  7.00% 
DMR/C 75/75-
170 
$8.00  5.00% $20.75  7.00% 
DMR/C 95/75 $17.50  10.60% $12.75  5.00% 
DMR/C 145/75 $17.50  10.60% $11.75  4.60% 
DMR/C 280/125 $14.25  8.70% $13.00  5.10% 
DMR/C 95/65 $14.00  8.50% $12.75  5.00% 
DMR/R 145/65 $16.00  9.70% $11.75  4.60% 
DMR/R 280/65 $16.00  9.70% $13.00  5.10% 
IDM 65-150 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
IDM 75-85 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
IDM 85/85-170 $8.00  5.00% $20.75  7.00% 
IDM 165/85-170 $20.75  7.00% $20.75  7.00% 
IDR 45/125-270 $8.00  5.00% $20.75  7.00% 





$25.70  7.00% $20.75  7.00% 
PMM-85 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
All PSM zones N/A N/A N/A N/A 
SM-NG 145 $13.25  6.00% $13.25  6.00% 
SM-NG 240 $20.00  9.00% $20.00  9.00% 
SM-SLU 
100/65-145 
$8.00  5.00% $7.75  3.00% 
SM-SLU 85/65-
160 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
SM-SLU 85-280 $8.00  5.00% $10.00  3.90% 
SM-SLU 
175/85-280 
$11.25  6.80% $10.00  3.90% 
SM-SLU 
240/125-440 
$10.00  6.10% $10.00  3.90% 
SM-SLU/R 
65/95 
$8.25  5.00% $12.75  5.00% 
SM-SLU 100/95 $8.00  5.00% $7.50  2.90% 
SM-SLU 145 $9.25  5.60% $7.75  3.00% 
SM-U 85 $7.00  5.00% $13.25  6.00% 
SM-U/R 75-240 $20.00  9.00% No Data No Data 
SM-U 75-240 $20.00  9.00% No Data No Data 
SM-U 95-320 $20.00  9.00% No Data No Data 
Note. Prices are for additional square feet above zoning restrictions, per square foot. 
Percentages are for the percentages of rent restricted units to be included that are deemed 
























0.840 0.734 0.812 -0.443 
Schools 0.160 0.140 0.150 -0.119 
Space Needle 0.110 0.112 0.112 -0.102 
Hospitals 0.003 -0.013 -0.008 0.000 
Transit Stops -0.156 -0.180 -0.170 0.191 
Water 0.195 0.145 0.176 -0.058 
Parks 0.138 0.132 0.138 -0.103 
Amazon -0.249 -0.311 -0.286 0.316 
Percent Male 0.035 0.076 -0.004 0.179 
Percent 
White 
-0.064 -0.001 -0.088 0.113 
Percent 
Middle-Aged 
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0.805 0.804 0.830 -0.588 
Schools -0.164 0.143 0.154 -0.123 
Space Needle 0.102 0.107 0.106 -0.100 
Hospitals 0.015 -0.003 0.004 -0.010 
Transit Stops -0.175 -0.203 -0.191 -0.216 
Water 0.236 0.182 0.216 -0.082 
Parks 0.176 0.161 0.173 -0.121 
Amazon -0.299 -0.361 -0.337 -0.362 
Percent Male 0.031 0.071 -0.005 -0.168 
Percent 
White 
-0.063 0.004 -0.091 0.123 
Percent 
Middle-Aged 
























-0.140 -0.120 -0.131 0.103 
Landmark 
Status 












0.652 0.752 0.721 -0.610 
Schools 0.140 0.122 0.131 -0.106 
Space Needle 0.051 0.065 0.060 -0.068 
Hospitals 0.023 0.006 0.012 -0.019 
Transit Stops -0.169 -0.199 -0.186 0.213 
Water 0.256 0.217 0.244 -0.127 
Parks 0.185 0.162 0.178 -0.117 
Amazon -0.327 -0.369 -0.356 -356.000 
Percent Male 0.045 0.077 0.019 0.121 
Percent 
White 
-0.058 0.000 -0.083 0.109 
Percent 
Middle-Aged 
























-0.123 -0.105 -0.114 0.089 
Landmark 
Status 












-0.048 -0.082 -0.065 0.082 
Schools -0.013 -0.006 -0.010 -0.001 
Space Needle 0.126 0.088 0.106 -0.056 
Hospitals -0.030 -0.018 -0.025 0.000 
Transit Stops 0.019 0.034 0.027 -0.045 
Water -0.083 -0.118 -0.100 0.139 
Parks -0.022 -0.006 -0.015 -0.009 
Amazon 0.110 0.080 -0.097 -0.051 
Percent Male -0.068 -0.076 -0.066 0.003 
Percent 
White 
0.022 0.022 0.021 -0.009 
Percent 
Middle-Aged 
























-0.044 -0.045 -0.045 0.045 
Landmark 
Status 




-.042 -.042 -.042 -.042 
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